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PATENT’S SECTION 101 SUBJECT-MATTER
ELIGIBILITY
Mark R. Carter†
Abstract
Since the Federal Circuit’s 2007 In re Bilski decision and the
Supreme Court’s 2008 Bilski v. Kappos decision, patent law’s
subject-matter eligibility standard under 35 U.S.C. §101 has been
uncertain. This paper posits patent law’s patent-ineligible abstract
ideas are science concepts and science laws, composed of science
concepts, as defined by science philosophers. Somewhat analogous to
copyright law, it also presents a downward patent-eligibility Hand
abstractions test from an alleged abstract idea, natural law, or
natural phenomenon to independent claims as a coherent, systematic,
and practical approach to judging utility-patent eligibility. Patent
claims manifest an innate vertical abstractions ladder, so there is no
need to further abstract ideas from the claims. The fact-finder must
add features to the alleged abstract idea, natural law, or natural
phenomenon to move down the abstractions ladder to see whether an
independent claim merges with the abstract idea, natural law, or
natural phenomenon while combating human compulsions, and the
test’s known bias, toward over-abstraction. The test automatically
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adjusts to ever-changing science concepts and laws and their word
expressions.
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COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS, & THE HAND ABSTRACTIONS TEST

Though William Landes and Richard Posner hinted at applying
copyright analysis to patents,1 almost no one has written about the
Hand abstractions test (abstractions test) applied to patent law.2
In 1995, before Landes and Posner, Maximillian Peterson
analogized copyright’s idea–expression split with patent’s machine–
program split under Section 101.3 Like Judge Learned Hand’s
confession that deciding between ideas and expression in any
copyright suit requires ad hoc judgment,4 Peterson concluded that
deciding between patentable machines and unpatentable algorithms in
any suit requires resorting to policy.5
In the past three years, two authors have applied copyright’s
abstractions test to patent law. First, Tun-Jen Chiang focused on
defining the invention and deciding enablement and patent scope.6
He found an abstractions problem in patent law by deeming a patent’s
specification and claims separately define the “invention.”7 Chiang
also proposed identifying the invention by idea novelty rather than by
embodiments.8 Chiang focused on the written description and
enablement requirements.9 But, unlike Peterson, by focusing on
claim construction and enablement, Chiang in essence assumed
eligibility under Section 101.10 Second, Jeffrey E. Young proposed
applying the abstractions test to patent-eligibility.11
Two decades ago, John Shepard Wiley Jr. tried to make
1. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 305-06 (2003).
2. Nick v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
3. Maximillian R. Peterson, Now You See It, Now You Don’t: Was it a Patentable
Machine or an Unpatentable “Algorithm”? On Principle and Expediency in Current Patent
Law Doctrine Relating to Computer/Implemented Inventions¸ 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 90, 12426 (1995).
4. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960)
(Hand, J.).
5. Peterson, supra note 3, at 124-26.
6. Tun-Jen Chiang, Defining Patent Scope by the Novelty of the Idea, 89 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1211 (2012) [hereinafter Chiang, Patent Scope]; Tun-Jen Chiang, The Levels of
Abstraction Problem in Patent Law, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1101, 1118-22 (2011)
[hereinafter Chiang, Levels of Abstraction].
7. Chiang, Levels of Abstraction, supra note 6, at 1101, 1118-22; see also Christopher
A. Cotropia, What is the Invention?, 53 WM. & MARY. L. REV. 1855 (2012).
8. Chiang, Patent Scope, supra note 6, at 1212.
9. Chiang, Levels of Abstraction, supra note 6, at 1102-03.
10. See id.
11. Jeffrey E. Young, A Level of Abstraction Approach for Post-Bilski § 101 Analysis, 84
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 875 (2012).
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copyright law more coherent by applying patent law concepts.12 First,
he proposed redefining copyright’s originality by “conditional
investment,” somewhat like patent’s ordinary skill in the art.13
Second, he proposed scrapping the idea–abstraction distinction for a
“conditional creation” subject to something like examining a patent.14
This paper more thoroughly applies the abstractions test to
patent-eligibility. My approach differs from Chiang’s and Young’s
approaches. First, unlike Chiang and Young, I see an innate
abstraction ladder/hierarchy in each patent’s claim structure. In
practice, the whole point in writing claims is to abstract invention
concepts. Second, unlike Chiang, I assume the standard “unitary”
invention patent view; the specification includes the claims and
together they describe one invention. Third, unlike Chiang, I focus on
patentable subject matter rather than novelty and nonobviousness
patentability. Fourth, I compare patent claims with natural laws.
Young expressly shunned this comparison.15
Part II of this paper highlights the patent-eligibility history
leading to the current controversy. Part III makes plain many innate
problems driving the controversy. Part IV explains why copyright
tools might help understand patent law given a history of cross-over
analysis and compares copyright’s idea-expression split with patent’s
abstract idea-invention split. It also describes copyright concepts tied
to the abstractions test in copyright. As copyright attaches to a work
without examination, courts almost always test copyrightability
during infringement suits. Part V then presents the downward patenteligibility Hand abstractions test (patent-eligibility abstractions test)
for patent-eligibility. Part VI then defines patent-ineligible abstract
ideas and laws of nature sitting atop the downward patent-eligibility
abstractions test as science concepts and science laws built on those
concepts. Finally, Part VII applies the downward patent-eligibility
abstractions test to claims in the recent case CLS Bank International
v. Alice Corp.

12. John Shepard Wiley Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 119
(1991).
13. Id. at 120, 146-56.
14. Id. at 121-37, 156-66.
15. Young, supra note 11 (“This article has not dealt with laws of nature, the subject of
Prometheus Laboratories Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services. Perhaps a similar charting of
levels of application of a law of nature would be helpful, but that discussion is for another
day.”).

CARTER

2014]

7/14/2014 6:56 PM

HAND ABSTRACTIONS TEST FOR SECTION 101

475

II. PATENT-ELIGIBILITY’S QUAG—SOFTWARE, STATE STREET,
AT&T, BILSKI, PROMETHEUS, & CLS BANK16
Section 101 of 35 U.S.C. states: “Whoever invents or discovers
any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.”17 Section 101 expressly defines four patent-eligible subjects: 1)
processes/methods; 2) machines; 3) “manufactures,” that is, “articles
of manufacture” or “manufactured articles”; and 4) compositions of
matter.18 The Supreme Court has excluded from patent-eligibility a
few subjects: abstract ideas, laws of nature, and natural
phenomenon.19
A. Software
Thirty years ago, the Supreme Court finally held software tied to
physically curing rubber to be a patent-eligible process/method under
35 U.S.C. Section 101.20 Eventually, the Federal Circuit secured
software patent-eligibility outright.21
B. State Street and AT&T
Software patent applications evolved to reach unpatentable
business methods, namely computerized auctions.22 The Federal
Circuit’s State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.
decision overruled the absolute ban against business method patents
by allowing a patent for computerized securities-portfolio

16. See generally LAWRENCE M. SUNG & JEFF E. SCHWARZ, PATENT LAW HANDBOOK
2010–2011 § 3:2 (2010).
17. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2013).
18. Id.
19. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303, 309 (1980)); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978) (Stevens, J.); Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67-68 (1974); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Innoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127,
130 (1948); Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v Howard, 20 Wall. 498, 507 (1874); Le Roy v. Tatham, 14
How. 156, 175 (1853)).
20. Compare Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185-93 (ruling a method for curing rubber by softwarecontrolled machines patent-eligible), with Benson, 409 U.S. at 64-67, 71-73 (ruling a software
process converting binary coded decimals numerals to pure binary numerals patent ineligible),
and Flook, 437 U.S. at 585-86, 594-95 (ruling a method calculating an alarm limit signaling an
abnormal or dangerous chemical reaction patent ineligible).
21. In re Allapat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc). See generally AMY LANDERS,
UNDERSTANDING PATENT LAW § 23.03 (2008).
22. In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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management.23 The 1952 Patent Act’s main drafter, Judge Giles S.
Rich, wrote the State Street opinion, so it had great weight. State
Street rested patent-eligibility on whether an invention produced a
useful, concrete, and tangible result.24
AT&T v. Excel
Communications applied State Street to hold that a mathematical
algorithm may be part of a patent-eligible process, creating a phonebilling signal, without physically transforming or converting
something.25 State Street and AT&T sowed the seeds for the current
patent-eligibility controversy.26
C. Bilski & Abstract Ideas
In the past few years, courts have revisited patentable subject
matter, that is, patent-eligibility. The Supreme Court’s seminal 2008
Bilski v. Kappos decision27 affirmed, yet criticized, the Federal
Circuit’s en banc In re Bilski.28 Bilski involved a business method for
hedging commodities’ trading risk.29 Both the patent examiner and
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences rejected the claims
under 35 U.S.C. Section 101.30 But the examiner stressed that the
claims did not involve “technological arts,” while the Board rejected
that reasoning.31 On appeal at the Federal Circuit, Chief Judge
Michel’s majority opinion also rejected the technological arts test for
the machine-or-transformation test. By adopting the machine-ortransformation test as the definitive patent-eligibility test, the Federal
Circuit, in effect, revived the business method patent ban.32
In Bilski v. Kappos, a fractured Supreme Court affirmed the
Federal Circuit’s en banc judgment while overruling its reasoning.33
Four justices joined most of Justice Kennedy’s main opinion, but
Justice Scalia refused to join parts II.B.2 and II.C.2.34 The part
23. State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (Rich, J.).
24. Id. at 1373-75 (quoting In re Allapat, 33 F.3d at 1544).
25. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
26. See, e.g., SUNG & SCHWARZ, supra note 16, § 3.2.
27. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
28. 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
29. See generally GALE R. PETERSON & DERRICK A. PIZARRO, 2009 FEDERAL CIRCUIT
YEARBOOK: PATENT LAW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 1:1, 1-6 (2009).
30. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 950 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 960.
33. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). See generally SUNG & SCHWARZ, supra
note 16, at 182-84.
34. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3223.
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supported by five justices critiqued the Federal Circuit for leaving the
machine-or-transformation test as the only patent-eligibility
standard.35 This part also stressed that business methods might be
patentable.36
As for the four-vote plurality opinions, section II.B.2 explained
that the machine-or-transformation test might help decide
patentability in modern times.37 For instance, computer programs are
now patentable.38 Further, section II.C.2 warned that rejecting
business methods merely because they lacked patentability until
recently would force courts to pose unnecessarily complex questions,
hiding patent law’s goal.39
Justice Stevens’ four-vote concurrence agreed that the machineor-transformation test should not be the only test for patenteligibility.40 But, unlike Justice Kennedy, Justice Stevens absolutely
rejected business method patent-eligibility.41 Yet, Justice Stevens
seemed to endorse the technology and technological arts test rejected
by the en banc Federal Circuit.42
Justice Breyer concurred to note the other opinions’ common
ground.43 Only Justice Scalia joined most, but not all, of Justice
Breyer’s opinion.44 Justice Breyer stressed that all Justices agreed the
claims were unpatentable, abstract, ideas.45 He also stressed that the
Kennedy and Stevens opinions agreed: 1) Section 101 is broad but
limited; 2) transformation and reduction to a different state or thing is
a clue to patentability; 3) the machine-or-transformation test is a clue
but not the sole test; and 4) not everything producing a useful,
concrete, and tangible result is patent-eligible.46 He ended quite
cryptically: “In sum, it is my view that, in reemphasizing that the
‘machine-or-transformation’ test is not necessarily the sole test of
patentability, the Court intends neither to de-emphasize the test’s
usefulness nor to suggest that many patentable processes lie beyond

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 3226-27.
Id. at 3228-29.
Id. at 3227-28 (Kennedy, J., plurality).
Id. at 3228-29.
Id. at 3229.
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231-32 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 3253-57.
Id. at 3244.
Id. at 3257 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3258-59.
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its reach.”47
In sum, the Supreme Court’s Bilski v. Kappos refused to let the
Federal Circuit only apply the machine-or-transformation test. It
stated many things the Federal Circuit should not do but failed to
positively guide the Federal Circuit on patent-eligibility.
D. Prometheus & Natural Laws
In 2012, the Supreme Court’s unanimous Mayo Collaborative
Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. decision again opined on
patent-eligibility.48 The patent claimed a method for treating
autoimmune diseases relying on the individualized metabolism of
each person receiving a compound.49 The Federal Circuit had applied
the machine-or-transformation test to uphold eligibility.50 The
Supreme Court deemed a person’s reaction to a drug a natural law.51
In rejecting eligibility, Justice Breyer stressed:
If a law of nature is not patentable, then neither is a process
reciting a law of nature, unless that process has additional features
that provide practical assurance that the process is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the law of nature itself. A
patent, for example, could not simply recite a law of nature and
52
then add the instruction “apply the law.”

Continuing, Breyer stressed the administering and determining
steps and a (wherein) clause only: 1) referred the natural law to a
relevant audience, doctors; 2) told doctors to perform routine tasks,
and 3) told doctors natural-law details.53 None of these claim
elements and features made the claims patent-eligible.
Regardless, whether Breyer’s opinion helped anyone, except the
Supreme Court, to understand patent-eligibility, especially in Bilski’s
wake, remains unknown.

47. Id. at 3259.
48. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
49. Id. at 1294-95.
50. Id. at 1296 (citing Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d
1336, 1345, 1346-47 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
51. Id. at 1296-97.
52. Id. at 1297.
53. Id. at 1297-98.
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E. CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp. Stalemate
In 2013, the Federal Circuit issued its en banc ruling in CLS
Bank International v. Alice Corporation.54 Only four judges joined
Judge Lourie’s “main” opinion. The decision included five other
opinions penned by Judges Rader, Moore, Newman, and Linn. Chief
Judge Rader wrote two opinions. Judge Lourie outlined a framework
identifying and defining “whatever fundamental concept appears
wrapped up in the claim” and then deciding whether a claim has an
“inventive concept” adding more than the “insignificant,
conventional, or routine.”55 But, beyond the normal hand-waving,
Judge Lourie gave no guidance on how to recognize an abstract idea.
Judge Rader’s first opinion stressed that no opinion garnered a
majority, implying no resulting precedent.56
This caselaw is a quite confused mess.57 As Mark A. Lemley
and his coauthors quite aptly noted before CLS Bank, “[p]ut simply,
the problem is that no one understands what makes an idea ‘abstract,’
and hence ineligible for patent protection.”58
This paper defines “abstract idea” and “natural law” for patent
law based on philosophy of science definitions. Inspired by
copyright’s abstractions test, it also posits a downward patenteligibility abstractions test for whether a patent claim is an abstract
idea, natural law, or natural phenomenon.
“Abstract ideas” in patent law are science concepts. They fall
into three groups: classificatory, comparative, and quantitative.
“Natural laws” in patent law are science laws. Science laws consist
of universal or statistical statements built on science concepts.
Patent has links to copyright, so the abstractions test used for
testing copyrightability is a candidate for testing patent-eligibility.
Patent claims have a built-in vertical abstraction ladder not requiring
any further abstraction. In fact, further abstraction runs afoul of the
abstraction test’s well-known over-abstraction bias in copyright and
known human compulsions to metaphorize and abstract every object
and concept.59
A downward patent-eligibility abstractions test could test patent54. CLS Bank Int'l. v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir.), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct.
734 (2013).
55. Id. at 1282-84.
56. Id. at 1292 n.1 (Rader, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
57. See id. at 1321-22 (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
58. Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1316 (2011).
59. See discussion infra Part III.D-E.
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eligibility while counteracting these biases and compulsions. All
patent claims are for ideas and rely on science concepts and science
laws. A downward abstraction from the alleged “abstract idea” (i.e.,
science concept) or “natural law” (i.e., science law) to reach the claim
can test eligibility.
Eligibility can vary by invention class. The science concept–law
distinction implies that most method claims will be tested against
science laws, rather than science concepts.
Further, manufactured articles and matter compositions should
have natural objects, natural phenomenon, or math relationships atop
the abstractions ladder.
Finally, a downward patent-eligibility abstractions test
accommodates changing expressions for science concepts and science
laws. Human expressions for science laws continually change with
periodic revolutionary shifts. In fact, this is the whole point of
science. But a downward patent-eligibility abstractions test only
judges how abstract ideas and natural laws relate to claims. Like a
math relation, the test plugs in an alleged science concept or science
law at the ladder’s top and the claim under test at the ladder’s bottom.
The downward patent-eligibility abstractions test itself has a “sciencelaw” form composed of science concepts, for example, that it
compares at each abstraction level. Thus, the test remains the same
over time, but the results of the test change as human expressions for
science concepts and science laws change.
Throughout this paper, I stress that patent-eligibility is distinct
from patentability under 35 U.S.C. Section 102 novelty and Section
103 obviousness. But, to compare claims against science concepts or
science laws, claims normally must meet 35 U.S.C. Section 112(b) by
particularly pointing out their subject matter.
III. PATENT-ELIGIBILITY’S INNATE PROBLEMS: WORDS FOR SCIENCE
CONCEPTS & LAWS, CHANGING EXPRESSIONS, & LANGUAGE’S
LIMITS
We must acknowledge some problems innate to deciding patenteligibility before choosing a particular way to test it. Though these
problems may be well known separately in science, engineering,
philosophy, linguistics, and even patent law, they are rarely stated in
one place. Thus, to make the problems clear and inform our best
effort at making a patent-eligibility test, I will expressly sum them up.
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Patent law issues patents for ideas.60 But, the patented idea must
not be an abstract idea.61 Patent law deems “laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas” as patent-ineligible subjects.62
Our legal system demands words. Thus, judging patenteligibility involves deciding whether word expressions for patent
claims match word expression for patent-ineligible laws of nature,
natural phenomenon, and abstract ideas.
But, as I will detail, deciding eligibility has many innate
problems which will guide us in formulating a patent-eligibility test.
First, human science-concept and science-law expressions continually
change with periodic revolutionary shifts as science progresses. In
fact, the whole point of science is to find these better expressions.
Thus, what humans understand and call a “science law” will
necessarily change.
Second, conceptual-semantics linguistics teaches that languages
have innate general limits in expressing concepts due to human
nature.
Third, though science laws expressed through math may be fairly
precise, scientists, conceptual-semantics linguists, and philosophers
know words break down in describing science concepts and, thus,
science laws.
Fourth, humans very heavily rely on metaphors, a way of
abstracting concepts, to convey even the most sophisticated science
concepts. This tendency can lead to errors in comparing g science
concepts and patent claims.
Fifth, though humans can see parts, humans, including lawyers
and judges, compulsively abstract concepts and objects into simple
schematics and structureless, holistic blobs. In essence, this is the
well-known “my eyes glaze over” “(MEGO)” human tendency to
gloss-over details.
These innate problems shed light on patent law’s general claim
language problems and its problems comparing claims with “abstract
ideas” and “laws of nature,” that is science concepts and science laws.

60.
61.
62.

LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1, at 305-06.
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
Id.
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A. Changing Science Expressions
1. Continual Change in Normal Science
Albert Einstein, an ex-patent examiner and holder of dozens of
patents, and Leopold Infeld tersely summed up the whole science
enterprise.63 “Science” is a human mental construct.64 What humans
deem reality changes as science progresses.65 Though humans made
science concepts before inventing physics, physics started with the
new quantitative concepts of mass and force and the qualitative
concept of an inertial system.66 As physics progressed, it destroyed
old concepts and created new ones to handle new phenomena such as
magnetic fields.67 Also, humans replaced some universal laws over
individual objects with statistical quantum probability laws over many
objects.68
Many scholars have agreed with Einstein and Infeld that human
expressions of science concepts and laws continually change. For
instance, Rudolf Carnap stressed the changing “partial
interpretations” of physics quantitative concepts.69 These partial
interpretations amount to a current representation of a physics laws.70
The partial interpretations change as physical concepts evolve.71
John Archibald Wheeler expressed the same idea with more
detail and with examples from chemistry and physics.72 “Every law
can be transcended.”73 For instance, Daniel Bernoulli’s 1722
proposition that heat, thermal dynamics, and temperature resulted
from chaotic molecular motion seemed preposterous, but scientists
now know the proposition is true.74 Also, chemistry once deemed
valence laws fundamental, but they break down at high temperatures

63. ALBERT EINSTEIN & LEOPOLD INFELD, THE EVOLUTION OF PHYSICS: FROM BASIC
CONCEPTS TO RELATIVITY AND QUANTA 294-97 (1938).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. RUDOLF CARNAP, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 102-03
(Martin Gardner ed., Basic Books 1974) (1966).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. JOHN ARCHIBALD WHEELER, A QUESTION OF PHYSICS: CONVERSATIONS IN PHYSICS
AND BIOLOGY 58-60 (Paul Buckley & F. David Peat eds., 1979).
73. Id. at 59.
74. Id. at 58.
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and pressures.75 After further investigation, all physics laws “seem
like approximations.”76
Since Wheeler’s statements, physics has enshrined the theory
that laws may vary with the energy scale as the “renormalization
group.”77
Like Wheeler, Richard Feynman stressed that physics laws
change.78
For instance, Einstein’s general relativity modified
Newton’s gravity.79 It may not be part of nature, but physics laws
change with time.80
2. Revolutionary Paradigms Shifts
Noting more dramatic changes, Thomas Kuhn stressed “normal”
science proceeds from seminal, “revolutionary,” science
achievements.81 Kuhn’s revolutionary science examples over the ages
include: Aristotle’s Physica, Ptolemy’s Almagest, Newton’s Principia
and Optiks, Franklin’s Electricity, Lavoisier’s Chemistry, and Lyell’s
Geology.82 Before modern science textbooks, these works left details
to be worked out that defined the legitimate problems and methods of
a research field for succeeding generations of practitioners.83 They
were able to do so because they shared two essential characteristics.84
“Their achievement was sufficiently unprecedented to attract an
enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of
scientific activity. Simultaneously, it was sufficiently open-ended to
leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group of practitioners to
resolve.”85
Kuhn offered Einstein’s general relativity, a theory of gravity, as
a revolutionary paradigm shift away from Newton’s laws.

75.
76.
77.

Id. at 59.
Id. at 59-60.
See, e.g., MICHAEL E. PESKIN & DANIEL V. SCHROEDER, AN INTRODUCTION TO
QUANTUM FIELD THEORY 393-438 (1995).
78. RICHARD FEYNMAN, THE CHARACTER OF PHYSICAL LAW 33 (M.I.T. Press 1967)
(1965).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 10 (2d ed. 1970)
(emphasis added).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. (emphasis added).
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It has not, that is, shown Newton’s laws to be a limiting case of
Einstein’s. For in the passage to the limit it is not only the forms
of laws that have changed. Simultaneously we have had to alter
the fundamental structural elements of which the universe to which
they apply is composed.
This need to change the meaning of established and familiar
concepts is central to the revolutionary impact of Einstein’s theory
. . . . Just because it did not involve the introduction of additional
objects or concepts, the transition from Newtonian to Einsteinian
mechanics illustrates with particular clarity the scientific
revolution as a displacement of the conceptual network through
86
which scientist view the world.

Thus, human expressions of physics laws change through
revolutionary paradigm shifts. But, viewing Kuhn’s work in context
of the other philosophers and scientists, expressions for physics laws
also change through normal science.
3. In re Bilski’s Approaches Fail to Evolve
Chief Judge Michel’s majority opinion rejected the technological
arts test.87 Judge Michel faulted the tests based on “‘technological
arts’ and ‘technology’” for being “both ambiguous and ever
changing.”88 But as we have seen, science concepts and laws
continually change implying the standard for patent-eligibility must
change to match the new concepts and laws. Thus, the changing
meaning of “technological arts” and “technology” fails to
automatically knock them out for a patent-eligibility standard.
Judge Dyk’s concurrence stressed that the dissenters, Judges
Newman, Mayer, and Rader, ignored consistent English practice due
to changing technology.89 But, as with Judge Michel’s opinion, this
approach ignores changing human science concepts and laws.
B. Languages’ Innate Limits in Expressing Concepts
The linguistics subfield conceptual semantics studies word
meaning. According to Steven Pinker, conceptual semantics involves
the relation of words to thoughts, human concerns, and reality.90
86. Id. at 102.
87. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 960 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 973 (Dyk, J., concurring) (quoting Malla Pollack, The Multiple
Unconstitutionality of Business Method Patents, 28 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 61, 96
(2002)).
90. STEVEN PINKER, THE STUFF OF THOUGHT: LANGUAGE AS A WINDOW TO HUMAN
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Languages have limits in expressing concepts, including science
concepts.91
Pinker has summed up many innate characteristics and problems
in expressing concepts in human language.92 Almost all human
languages share some basic concepts.93 Words digitize analog
reality.94 That is, words try to capture or represent human concepts
about the reality around us; they are not the reality itself.95 To
express abstract ideas, humans almost always rely on metaphors.96
Words tend to reduce each entity, idea, and object to a single, holistic,
blob without parts, though humans can articulate subparts.97
This implies that humans tend to automatically think of a “patent
claim” as an abstract blob, but humans can train themselves to think
of the claim’s elements. Echoing Heisenberg and other science
philosophers,98 everyday concepts break down for modern science
and modern non-local property, for instance, patents and copyrights.99
Echoing Heisenberg’s thoughts, Pinker notes humans give old
expressions new meanings and make new ones to describe science
concepts and laws.100 Ironically, Pinker notes many semantic
problems climax in engineering and law, the two most important
fields for patent law.101
C. Break Down of Words in Describing Science Concepts &
Science Laws
Word ambiguities are a well-known in patent law. “Patent claim
drafting is an art, not a precise science. There is no correct or best
claim.”102 In fact, word ambiguities are the main problem in drafting
and interpreting patent claims. Yet, law demands words for statutes,
regulations, contracts, and patent claims as legal systems must apply

THOUGHT (2007).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 428-38.
93. Id. at 81-82.
94. Id. at 3-4, 428.
95. Id. at 4-6, 153-234.
96. PINKER, supra note 90, at 6, 235-78.
97. Id. at 429.
98. Infra Part III.C.
99. See id. at 433-34.
100. Id. at 257.
101. Id. at 225, 228.
102. See, e.g., ROBERT C. FABER, FABER ON MECHANICS OF CLAIM DRAFTING § 10.1 (6th
ed. 2012).
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to a quite broad range of situations. Acknowledging the innate
problem with words for describing science and engineering, the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office stresses “[a] fundamental principle . . .
is that applicants are their own lexicographers. They can define in the
claims . . . in whatever terms they choose so long as any special
meaning assigned to a term is clearly set forth in the specification.”103
Philosophers and scientists have noted innate problems
expressing science concepts and laws in words. As our legal system
demands words to judge whether a patent claim is only an abstract
idea or law of nature, their insights will help judge whether a patent
claim is ineligible.
1. Science Concepts
Words innately poorly express science concepts. Heisenberg and
Feynman noted that physicists use a math language but must rely on
words to describe their results.104 Language concepts have been a
research topic at least since Socrates.105 Aristotle analyzed language
forms and the structure of conclusions.106 Mathematics has become a
precise language abstracting science concepts from reality and
avoiding ambiguities innate to verbal languages.107 But, to describe
science to others, scientists associate their mathematical or logical
relationships with words.108 Also, physicists judge a physicist’s
understanding by his or her skill in expressing science concepts and
laws in words.109
These words embody concepts. Scientists may associate new
science concepts with old words or create new words to convey the
concepts.110 As Heisenberg explained:
Still, in the process of expansion of scientific knowledge the
language also expands; new terms are introduced and the old ones
are applied in a wider field or differently from ordinary language.
Terms such as “energy,” “electricity,” “entropy” are obvious
examples. In this way we develop a scientific language which may

103. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFF., MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2173.01 (rev. 9, 2012) [hereinafter MPEP] (emphasis added).
104. WERNER HEISENBERG, PHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY 168 (1958); see FEYNMAN, supra
note 78, at 40-41.
105. HEISENBERG, supra note 104, at 169.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 172.
108. Id. at 168; see FEYNMAN, supra note 78, at 40-41.
109. HEISENBERG, supra note 104.
110. Id. at 173.
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be called a natural extension of ordinary language adapted to be
111
added fields of scientific knowledge.

But, these terms of art may easily create ambiguities in
interpreting the old words with the new concepts. Also, translating
the math or logic into a word language, like English, innately
introduces ambiguities through concepts “lost in translation.”112
Heisenberg credits words’ poor fit for science with their
origination in ancient times to communicate and think.113 Language
grew by chance and illogically.114 “It is of course a well known fact
that the words are not so clearly defined as they seem.”115 (This
“fact” further shows Carnap’s point that scientists talk about universal
laws as “facts.”) For instance, “piece of iron” and “piece of wood”
make sense, but “piece of water” does not.116 And, “red” and “green”
may mean very different things to different people, for instance, when
one is colorblind.117
In sum, scientists grope for ways to translate their results into
words. They associate existing words with science concepts and
create a semantic or definitional ambiguity for the word. They adapt
the language to try to fit the current science concepts for the current
expression of laws. They also invent new words to carry their
mathematical or logical science concepts.
But, as with any
translation, the process imperfectly captures, that is digitizes, the
science concepts in words.
2. Science Laws
Words have innate problems expressing science laws.118 Like
Carnap’s scheme of partial interpretations, Heisenberg noted that
physicists match symbols with observable quantities letting natural
laws be described in verbal language.119 Also, Carnap noted that
symbolic logic gives precision to science statements, but English
makes it easy to confuse singular fact statements with universal law

111. Id. (emphasis added).
112. FEYNMAN, supra note 78, at 40; HEISENBERG, supra note 104, at 179.
113. HEISENBERG, supra note 104, at 168-69.
114. Id. at 168.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 169.
118. CARNAP, supra note 69 at 4–6; see also HEISENBERG, supra note 104, at 167-86
(discussing these problems in Chapter 10 “Language and Reality in Modern Physics”).
119. See HEISENBERG, supra note 104, at 167-86.
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statements.120 For instance:
If a zoologist writes in a textbook, “The elephant is an excellent
swimmer”, he does not mean that a certain elephant, which he
observed a year ago in a zoo, is an excellent swimmer. When he
says “the elephant”, he is saying “the” in the Aristotelian sense; it
121
refers to the entire class of elephants.

Scientists too can fall into the trap of calling universal law
statements “facts.” For instance, simple physical “fact” statements
are really universal laws: “electric currents create heat when flowing
through conductors;” “electric currents create magnetic fields when
flowing through conductors;” and “substances expand when
heated.”122
D. Human Reliance on Metaphors for Even the Most Complex
Science Concepts
1. Metaphors in Language
Pinker notes that language overflows with metaphors:
[L]anguage is saturated with implicit metaphors like EVENTS
ARE OBJECTS and TIME IS SPACE. Indeed, space turns out to
be a conceptual vehicle not just for time but for many kinds of
states and circumstances. Just as a meeting can be moved from
3:00 to 4:00, a traffic light can go from green to red, a person can
go from flipping burgers to running a corporation, and the
economy can go from bad to worse. Metaphor is so widespread in
language that it’s hard to find expressions for abstract ideas that
123
are not metaphorical.

2. Abstract Ideas as Metaphors
Humans almost always express abstract ideas as metaphors.124
Science concepts and laws are merely a special case. Metaphors have
import by capturing “relations among parts, even if the parts
themselves are very different.” 125 In fact:
[M]any scientific theories were first stated as analogies, and often
are still best explained that way: gravity is like light, heat is like a

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

CARNAP, supra note 69, at 3-7.
Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
Id. at 5-6.
PINKER, supra note 90, at 6 (emphasis added except for original capitalization).
Id. at 3, 6.
Id. at 254.
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fluid, evolution is selective breeding. For an analogy to be
scientifically useful, though, the correspondences can’t apply to a
part of one thing that merely resembles a part of the other. They
have to apply to the relationships, and to the relationships between
126
the relationships between the relationships. .

As discussed, Heisenberg noted the ability to simply describe
science in words is deemed to show understanding.127 For instance
Nicolas Carnot analogized heat transfer with water in a waterfall.128
“If one were to draw box-and-arrow diagrams of the two systems
indicating what depends on what and what causes what, the geometry
of the two diagrams would be the same; only the labels would be
different.”129
To work, science analogies must be disciplined.130 Dedre
Gentner and her collaborator Michaels Jeziorksi point out that this
mental discipline is essential to the sound use of analogy in science,
but it didn’t come easy. Loose metaphors are the hallmarks of
pseudoscience, quacks, bad science writing, and bad science
teaching.131
Making science metaphors is part of associating language with
science. As Heisenberg noted, scientists match science concepts with
words. Pinker (and Richard Boyd) likewise notes:
[M]etaphor is one of many devices available to the scientific
community to accomplish the task of accommodation of language
to the causal structure of the world. . . . the task of introducing
terminology, and modifying usage of existing terminology, so that
linguistic categories are available which describe the casually and
132
explanatorily significant features of the world.
Metaphor in science, Boyd suggests, is a version of the everyday
process in which a metaphor is pressed in service to fill gaps in a
language’s vocabulary, like rabbit ears to refer to the antennas that
used to sprout from the tops of television sets. . . . The metaphor
evolves into a technical term for an abstract concept that subsumes
both the target phenomenon and the source phenomenon. It’s an

126. Id. (citing Dedre Gentner and collaborators).
127. HEISENBERG, supra note 104, at 168.
128. Id.
129. PINKER, supra note 90, at 254-55.
130. Id. at 255-56.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 257 (quoting Richard Boyd, Metaphor and Theory Change: What is a
“Metaphor” a Metaphor for?, in METAPHOR AND THOUGHT (A. Ortony ed., 2d ed. 1993))
(emphasis added).
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instance of something that every philosopher of science knows
about scientific language and that most laypeople misunderstand:
scientists don’t “carefully define their terms” before beginning an
investigation. Instead they use words loosely to point to a
phenomenon in the world, and the meaning of words gradually
become more precise as the scientists come to understand the
133
phenomenon more thoroughly.

This quote expressly relates science analogies to science
philosophy. This giving old terms new meanings, making new terms,
and analogies harkens to Heisenberg’s thoughts on describing science
concepts and laws with words.134 The quote’s suggestions of “cause,”
“goal,” and “change” echo world-wide basic language concepts.135
E. Compulsive Human Abstraction
1. Stock Human Thoughts
Human “characterizations of reality” in science laws and patent
claims, expressed in language, are built from a stock “inventory of
thoughts.”136 “The inventory begins with some basic units, like
events, states, things, substances, places, and goals. It specifies the
basic ways in which these units can do things: acting, going,
changing, being, [and] having.”137 Thus, science concepts and the
science laws including them are built from the stock thought
inventory.
Process/method claims include Pinker’s “actions.” Almost by
definition, patent processes/methods require gerunds like Pinker’s
“acting, going, changing.”138 Process/method claim steps involve
“actions . . . with a goal in mind.”139 Thus, the steps can have “a
destination of motion . . . or the state resulting from a change.”140
“Humans have a primitive concept of number, which
distinguishes only one, two, and many, though they can also estimate
larger quantities approximately.”141 An old, but true, physics joke
asserts that physicists only understand one, two, and an infinite

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
HEISENBERG, supra note 104, at 173.
Id. at 81-82.
PINKER, supra note 90, at 428.
Id.
FABER, supra note 102, § 4:2 (discussing method steps as gerunds).
PINKER, supra note 90, at 428.
Id.
Id. at 429.
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number of things. Physicists thoroughly understand how one body
moves and two bodies interact.142 Statistical mechanics studies very
large, practically infinite, numbers of bodies, such as molecules and
atoms in a liquid or solid.143 It closely relates to heat through
molecular motions in solids, liquids, and gases.144 But a “closedform,” that is exact, solution for three bodies moving under each
other’s influence has humbled physicists and mathematicians for
centuries.145
2. Abstracting Objects into Schematic Models
Pinker also stresses that humans boil down objects into
schematic models that can be easily spatially manipulated.146 In fact,
patent claim elements make up a claim diagram “stick figure,” or
schematic, showing how claim elements relate.147 The stick figure is
a standard tool for analyzing, and checking, patent-claim structure.148
3. Patent Claim Elements & Whole Claims as Single
“Abstract” Ideas
Humans tend to see entities and ideas as blobs without parts.149
“The entire object is thought to be located in a spot, or to move as a
whole, or to have a trait that suffuses it, or to change from one state to
another in its entirety (as a wagon loaded with hay, or a garden
swarming with bees).”150
Like everyone else, lawyers, and judges, compulsively think
holistically. In fact, virtually the whole legal system worships
holistic, yes or no, answers: guilty versus not guilty; liable versus not
liable; infringed versus not infringed; valid versus invalid; grant
versus deny; affirm versus reverse. Disputes spanning years and
thousands of pages resolve into holistic, yes or no, black or white,
answers. As every law student knows, cases come to “stand for” a
particular rule. That rule, the holding, is normally expressed as a
simple sentence or two and nicely fits into an outline or hornbook on
142.
143.

See, e.g., HERBERT GOLDSTEIN, CLASSICAL MECHANICS (2d ed. 1980).
See, e.g., F. REIF, FUNDAMENTALS OF STATISTICAL MECHANICS AND THERMAL
PHYSICS 47-86 (1965).
144. Id. at 87-127.
145. E.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 142, at 453, 528, 540.
146. PINKER, supra note 90, at 430.
147. FABER, supra note 102, § 3:22.
148. Id.
149. PINKER, supra note 90, at 429
150. Id.
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a particular legal field. The rule is later applied in other cases under
stare decisis. In a sense, relief has more play; damages can widely
range along a single dimension, money value, and equitable relief is
even more open. Even so, a court will award damages and enjoin acts
versus no damages and no injunction.
So, in the context of patent claims, humans tend to think of what
a patent claim is as a holistic blob (i.e., a single thing) having “a
trait.” In other words, humans tend to automatically associate an
abstract idea with anything, including a patent claim. Humans
reduce “Claim 1” to some holistic thing. As Posner noted, patents
protect ideas, unlike copyright.151
Thus, when humans, such as patent lawyers and judges, reduce
“Claim 1” to a holistic idea, that is, a single idea, it becomes quite
easy to think of “Claim 1” as an “abstract idea.”
“But humans are also capable of articulating an object into its
parts and registering how they are related to one another (as in the
bottom of a wagon or the edge of the garden).”152 Likewise, humans
can articulate claims as having parts, that is, elements.
Even so, applying the holistic “blob” precept, humans tend to
reduce these elements to holistic blobs. And each claim element is a
blob making a stick-figure claim schematic.153
For software, Julie Cohen and Mark Lemley noted an overly
abstract view could yield patent infringement where none should
exist, like a copyrighted work’s last abstractions yielding unprotected
(i.e., uncopyrightable) ideas with the abstractions test.154
Perhaps showing these abstraction tendencies, patent claim
language seems to have remained stable over time and across
fields.155 Despite changes in science and technology, claim length has
failed to change much over time or between fields.156
F. Words Describe Basic Mechanical Engineering
Pinker notes that words work quite well to describe basic
151. Assessment Techs. of Wis., LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir.
2003) (Posner, J.).
152. PINKER, supra note 90, at 429
153. FABER, supra note 102, § 3:22.
154. Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software
Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 49 & n.210 (2001) (quoting Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45
F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, J.)).
155. Kristen Osenga, The Shape of Things to Come: What We Can Learn from Patent
Claim Language Length, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 617 (2012).
156. Id.
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engineering.157 For instance, words can describe a toilet’s basic
operation very well.158 They also describe other basic engineering
concepts quite well: cooking recipes, first-aid instructions, housekeeping hints, sewing patterns, home-repair manuals, and sports
tips.159 In essence, all these examples involve basic mechanical
engineering related to everyday objects. Under Carnap’s system, any
science laws involved are “empirical,” dealing with directly
observable properties rather than “theoretical.”160
IV. COPYRIGHT LAW’S LINKS TO PATENT LAW
Copyright law has many links to patent law. First, Congress gets
its power to grant copyrights and patents from the same constitutional
clause. Second, the Supreme Court has often analogized copyrights
and patents. Third, scholars have applied patent law concepts to
copyright. Fourth, scholars have compared copyrightability with
patentability.
The Constitution’s Intellectual Property (IP) Clause grants
Congress the “Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”161
Unlike trademarks, Congress gets its power to grant copyrights and
patents from the IP Clause.162
Given the IP Clause grant, the Supreme Court has often
analogized copyrights with patents and vice versa. For instance, the
Court stressed its steadfast rejection of an automatic-injunction rule to
remedy copyright infringement in rejecting an automatic-injunction
rule to remedy patent infringement.163 Also, by analogy to patent
law’s non-infringing staple articles defense, the Court ruled the maker
of a video cassette recorder (VCR)’ not vicariously liable, as the VCR

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

PINKER, supra note 90, at 226-28.
Id. at 226-27.
Id. at 228.
CARNAP, supra note 69, at 6, 225-28.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93-95 (1879) (Miller, J.). See generally
MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 1.10-13 (5th ed. 2010)
(comparing patent, copyright, and trademark law); MARY LAFRANCE, UNDERSTANDING
TRADEMARK LAW, §§ 1.06-1.11 (2d ed. 2009) (comparing trademark law with patent and
copyright law); JANE C. GINSBURG & ROBERT A. GORMAN, COPYRIGHT LAW 8-11 (2012)
(comparing copyright law with patent and trademark law).
163. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 392-93 (2006) (quoting
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127-28 (1932)).
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had substantial non-infringing uses.164
Like the Supreme Court, some scholars have tried making
copyright analysis more precise by applying patent concepts. Wiley
rejected copyright’s idea-expression split and abstractions test as
hopelessly vague and impractical.165 Like conditioning an invention’s
patentability on examination, Wiley proposed making copyright
conditional and analogized a traditional copyright analysis with patent
examination.166
Landes and Posner linked copyrightability with patentability.167
They noted both copyright and patent law failed to protect ideas.168
Uncopyrightable ideas are “standard plots, stock characters, verse
forms, literary and musical genres, schools of painting, dramatic
conventions, iconography, and the like.”169 Patent-ineligible ideas are
“fundamental scientific (including mathematical) and technological
principles.”170 But, Landes and Posner related the unprotectable ideas
in copyright and patent by “both . . . the enormous potential for rent
seeking that would be created if property rights could be obtained in
them and in the enormous transactions costs that would be imposed
on would-be users.”171 Prometheus quoted the same passage by
Landes and Posner in stressing that natural laws should fail
patentability.172
Even so, Judge Posner contrasted copyright and patent ideas.
A copyright demands only enough originality to distinguish a work
from like public domain works.173 Unlike copyright law, patent law
requires “substantial originality,” that is, novelty and nonobviousness, before granting a patent.174 He also stressed patents
grant greater market power as patents protect ideas, while copyrights
do not.175
164. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439-42 (1984).
165. Wiley, supra note 12, at 121-29.
166. Id. at 156-58.
167. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1, at 305-06.
168. Id. at 305.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 305-06, quoted with approval in Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc.¸132 S. Ct. 1289, 1302 (2012).
172. 132 S. Ct. at 1302.
173. Assessment Techs. of Wis., LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 643 (7th Cir.
2003) (Posner, J.) (citing Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir.
2003); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951)).
174. Id. (citing Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345-48 (1991)).
175. Id. at 647.
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But, despite these differences, patent-ineligible ideas link to
copyright-ineligible ideas. In introducing the abstractions test, Judge
Hand compared copyright-ineligible ideas in Shakespeare’s Twelth
Night with Einstein’s theory of relativity and Darwin’s The Origin of
Species.176 Seventy-five years later, a prominent 2005 case stressed
the Abstraction Test’s usefulness for literary works by noting
relativity could function as a “literary” idea: “two different authors
each can describe, with very different words, the theory of special
relativity. The words will be protected as expression. The theory is a
set of unprotected ideas.”177 Thus, copyright-ineligible ideas include
patent-ineligible ideas.
Copyright law’s ties to patent law, especially for copyrightability
and patentability, suggest copyright tests and tools might apply to
works that are both copyrightable and patentable, as well as patent
law in general. Software is both copyrightable and patentable. The
abstractions test has been applied to software. Recently, the
abstractions test has been applied to patent law.
A. Getting Intellectual Property (IP) Protection
Patents are far harder to get than copyrights. Copyright attaches
the moment an author fixes a work in a tangible medium.178 A
copyright holder may register the copyrighted work.179 Registration,
but not examination, is required before an infringement lawsuit may
be initiated.180
In contrast, patents must be examined and issued by the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) before an inventor gets full
patent protection.181 Even so, a patent’s analog to fixing in a tangible
medium is conception with “reduction to practice.”182 Before the
recent America Invents Act (AIA), the United States had a “first-toinvent” system.183 An inventor got inventive priority for a patent
application and issued patent from the conception date if the inventor
diligently worked toward reduction to practice.184 Actual reduction to

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, J.).
Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
Id. § 410
Id. § 411(a).
35 U.S.C. §§ 111, 131, 151.
Id. § 102(g)(2).
Id.
Id.; 37 C.F.R. § 1.131(b).

CARTER

496

7/14/2014 6:56 PM

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 30

practice meant building a working model.185 Constructive reduction
to practice meant filing a patent application meeting the enablement
and written description requirements.186
Now, the AIA has
established America’s first-to-file system in line with most other
nations. New patent applications only get priority through earlier
patent applications in the U.S. or abroad.187
Due to patent’s formal grant process through the USPTO, patent
applicants may appeal patent-application rejections directly to district
court188 or the Federal Circuit.189 In contrast, copyright validity is
only judged during an infringement lawsuit.190
B. Eligible Subject Matter
1. Copyright’s Idea-Expression Split: Ineligible vs.
Eligible Subject-Matter
To be copyright eligible, a work must be an “original work of
authorship.”191 Copyrightable subject matter includes: 1) literary
works; 2) musical works, along with any accompanying words; 3)
dramatic works, along with any accompanying music; 4) pantomimes
and choreographic works; 5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; 7) sound recordings;
and 8) architectural works.192
With the positive requirements of originality, authorship, and
fitting into a class, the Copyright Act also carves out copyrightineligible subject matter. Copyright does not cover “any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle,
or discovery.”193 In essence, the bar against procedures, processes,
systems, and methods of operation separates copyrights from
patents.194

185. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.204(2)(ii).
186. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2); 37 C.F.R. § 41.201.
187. 35 U.S.C. §§ 119, 120 (2006).
188. Id. § 145.
189. Id. § 141.
190. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 408 (2012).
191. Id. § 102(a).
192. Id. §§ 102(a)(1)-(8).
193. Id. § 102(b); see also 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(b) (2012) (discussing “ideas, plans, methods,
or devices, as distinguished from the particular manner in which they are expressed or described
in a writing”).
194. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (rejecting copyright eligibility of a bookkeeping system as more suitable for patent).

CARTER

2014]

7/14/2014 6:56 PM

HAND ABSTRACTIONS TEST FOR SECTION 101

497

But, the bar against ideas, concepts, principles, and discoveries
enforces a more basic exclusion from copyright protection. This
“idea” bar has led to a long and rich case law weeding copyrightineligible parts from copyrightable works.195 Though an idea’s
expression may be copyright eligible, the idea lacks eligibility.196
Copyright calls this split the idea-expression dichotomy. As the
regulations note: “Ideas, plans, methods, systems, or devices, as
distinguished from the particular manner in which they are expressed
or described in writing” are copyright ineligible.197
Doctrine has extended copyright ineligible ideas. First, elements
necessarily following from copyright ineligible ideas are likewise
copyright ineligible.198 Second, stock story elements, called scenes a
faire, are copyright ineligible.199 Third, merger posits even an idea’s
expression is copyright ineligible if the idea can only be expressed in
limited ways.200 If so, the idea and expression “merges” to become
copyright ineligible.
2. Hand Abstractions Test (Abstractions Test)—
Separating Copyright-Ineligible Ideas from
Eligible Expression
a. General Test
Judge Learned Hand first stated the abstractions test with:
It is of course essential to any protection of literary property,
whether at common-law or under the statute, that the right cannot
be limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by
immaterial variations. . . .
But when the plagiarist does not take out a block in suit, but an
abstract of the whole, the decision is more troublesome. Upon any
work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of
increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the
incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most

195. Id.; see also A. A. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.
1980) (finding historical facts ineligible). See generally LEAFFER, supra note 162, § 2.13;
GINSBURG & GORMAN, supra note 162, at 27-35.
196. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(b).
197. Id. (emphasis added).
198. See generally GINSBURG & GORMAN, supra note 162, at 30-31; LEAFFER, supra note
162, § 2.13[B][1].
199. See generally LEAFFER, supra note 162, § 2.13[B][4].
200. See generally GINSBURG & GORMAN, supra note 162, at 30-31; LEAFFER, supra note
162, § 2.13[B][1].
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general statement of what the play is about, and at times might
consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series of
abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise
the playwright could prevent the use of his ‘ideas,’ to which, apart
from their expression, his property is never extended. . . . In such
cases we are rather concerned with the line between expression
201
and what is expressed.

In sum, the abstractions test guides both infringement and
copyrightability. First, to test copyrightability, the abstractions test
tries to abstract ideas from the “expression” embodied in the full
copyrighted work. If the expression is merely an idea, the work is
uncopyrightable. If not, the work is copyrightable and “cannot be
limited literally to the text.”
Second, to test infringement, one can compare the abstraction
against an accused work. After a series of abstractions, the test
potentially reaches uncopyrightable ideas of “what is expressed” in
the copyrighted work which can no longer be infringed. A few years
later, Judge Hand stressed that a play may be pirated without the
dialogue as a play included “words and gestures and scenery and
costume and . . . looks of the actors themselves. . . . No plagiarist can
excuse the wrong by showing how much of his work he did not
pirate.”202 Succinctly, “[a] copyright never extends to the ‘idea’ of
the ‘work,’ but only to its ‘expression,’ and that no one infringes,
unless he descends so far into what is concrete as to invade that
‘expression.’”203 But, shortly before his death, Judge Hand admitted:
“Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has
gone beyond copying the ‘idea,’ and has borrowed its ‘expression.’
Decisions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc.”204
Thus, the accused work need not be identical to a copyrighted
work to infringe it. An abstraction of the accused work may match
the copyrighted work or vice versa. But Judge Hand saw the decision
between idea and expression as inevitably vague and arbitrary.

201. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (emphasis
added) (citing Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 86 (1899); Guthrie v. Curlett, 36 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.
1929)). See generally STEPHEN M. MCJOHN, COPYRIGHT 97-101 (2d ed. 2009).
202. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1936), aff’d,
309 U.S. 490 (1940).
203. Nat’l Comics Publ’ns v. Fawcett Publ’ns, 198 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1952) (Hand, J.)
(emphasis added).
204. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960)
(Hand, J.).
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b. Non-Verbal Works
A few years ago, an influential district-court opinion weighed
applying the abstractions test to photographs.205 It concluded that the
idea-expression split breaks down for non-textual, that is, visual,
works.206 Quoting Peter Pan, the court noted “[i]n the case of
designs, which are addressed to the aesthetic sensibilities of the
observer, the test is, if possible, even more intangible.”207 It also
quoted and adopted views from Judge Jon O. Newman’s paper:
[W]hether courts should be making those determinations with the
same modes of analysis and even the same vocabulary that was
appropriate for writings. . . . [I]t is not just a matter of vocabulary.
Words convey concepts, and if we use identical phrases from one
context to resolve issues in another, we risk failing to notice that
208
the relevant concepts are and ought to be somewhat different.

The court noted Judge Jon Newman had opined one cannot
divide a visual work into neat abstraction layers in precisely the same
way as text.209 I will return to this view later in applying the
abstractions test to patents, as patent claims deal with visual concepts.
3. Eligible vs. Ineligible Subject Matter for Utility
Patents—Abstract vs. Inventive Ideas
To be eligible for a utility patent, an entity must “invent[] or
discover[] any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof.”210 Paraphrasing, an inventor must “invent or discover”
something “new and useful” to get a patent.211 Also, the patentable
invention or discovery must be in one of the four classes: 1)
process/method; 2) machine, 3) manufacture/article, or 4)
composition of matter.212
By positively requiring invention or discovery of something

205. Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 455-61 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(quoting Peter Pan Fabrics, 274 F.2d at 489; Hon. Jon O. Newman, New Lyrics for an Old
Melody: The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in the Computer Age, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
691, 697 (1999); Warner Bros. v. ABC, 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983) (Newman, J.); Franklin
Mint Corp. v. Nat’l Wildlife Art Exch., Inc., 575 F.2d 62, 65 (3d Cir. 1978)).
206. Id. at 458-61.
207. Id. at 459 (quoting Peter Pan Fabrics, 274 F.2d at 489).
208. Id. (quoting Newman, supra note 205, at 697).
209. Id. (quoting Newman, supra note 205, at 698).
210. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
211. Id.
212. Id.
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“new and useful” that fits into one of the four classes, the Patent Act
fails to specifically carve out basic subject matter ineligible for a
utility patent. But, the Patent Act substantively limits inventions to
novel and non-obvious inventions or discoveries.213
Even so, courts have developed patent-ineligible classes. Patentineligible subjects include: mathematical formulas;214 products of
nature and natural phenomena;215 abstract ideas; and natural laws.216
4. Copyright Law’s Idea–Expression Split Versus Patent
Law’s Natural Law–Invention Split
Landes and Posner compared and contrasted copyright law’s
idea-expression split with patent law’s natural law-invention split.217
Ideas cannot be copyrighted, but their expression may be
copyrighted.218 Likewise, natural laws cannot be patented.219 But,
unlike copyright, “ideas” can be patented.220 In court opinions,
Posner further compared patents and copyrights:
Copyright law unlike patent law does not require substantial
originality. In fact, it requires only enough originality to enable a
work to be distinguished from similar works that are in the public
domain, since without some discernible distinction it would be
impossible to determine whether a subsequent work was copying a
221
copyrighted work or a public-domain work.

213. Id. §§ 102, 103.
214. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
215. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
216. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981).
217. See generally GINSBURG & GORMAN, supra note 162, at 27-32, 137-40.
218. Id. (quoting Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 57
(1976); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936) (Hand, J.), aff’d,
309 U.S. 390 (1940)); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand,
J.); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960) (Hand, J.);
Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); MARSHALL A. LEAFFER,
UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 2.13, 78-92 (5th ed. 2010).
219. But see Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 91 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951)
(Frank, J.) (distinguishing copyright’s originality from patent’s inventorship); Mazer v. Stein,
204 F.2d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1953) (distinguishing copyrighted works from design patents), aff’d,
347 U.S. 201 (1954).
220. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
221. Assessment Techs. of Wis., LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 643, 647 (7th Cir.
2003) (Posner, J.) (citing Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345-48
(1991); Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.);
Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951)); see also
ConFold Pac., Inc. v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 433 F.3d 952, 958-59 (7th Cir. 2006) (Posner, J.)
(comparing trade secrets, patents, and copyrights).
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The following table sums-up the main correspondences between
copyright law and patent law:
Table 1.
COPYRIGHT

PATENT

Copyrightability

Validity including Eligibility

Idea

Abstract Idea, Natural Law, or
Natural Phenomenon

Expression

Invention = Described & Enabled
(§ 112), Novel (§ 102) &
Nonobvious (§ 103)

Fixation

Conception and/or Reduction to
Practice

C. Abstractions Test for Software
Abstractions test is a standard copyright tool for filtering out
uncopyrightable elements from a copyrighted work. With the 1980’s
technology boom, software writers tried to, and did, copyright
software.222 Thus, courts and authors naturally recognized the
abstractions test might apply to software.223
As software patent protection rose, authors weighed applying the
abstractions test to software patents. In 1995, Peterson briefly noted
courts applied something like the abstractions test to determine the
patentability of computer-implemented inventions’.224 He deemed the
abstractions ran from an invention’s “embodiment . . . with purely
‘physical steps’ (i.e. a machine)” to “an embodiment of the invention
as an intangible program or ‘algorithm.’”225 Though Peterson thought

222. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1248 (3d. Cir.
1983). See generally LAEFFER, supra note 162, §§ 6.04-6.06[E]-[F]; GINSBURG & GORMAN,
supra note 162, at 25-26, 33.
223. Computer Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 98 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992); Susan L. Mashour,
Note, Proposed Judicial Guidelines for Deciding Software Infringement Actions, 32 WAYNE L.
REV. 1191, 1199-2000 (1986). See generally LAEFFER, supra note 162, §§ 9.04[E]-[F];
GINSBURG & GORMAN, supra note 162, at 139. But see George N. Grammas, Note, The Test for
Proving Copyright Infringement of Computer Software: ‘Structure, Sequence, And
Organization’ And ‘Look And Feel’ Cases, 14 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 105 (1988) (reviewing
other software copyright infringement tests).
224. Peterson, supra note 3, at 120-26 & nn. 258-68, 283 (1995) (discussing Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409
U.S. 63 (1972); In re Allapat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc)).
225. Id. at 123.
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the abstractions test could be applied to other invention types, he saw
computer-implemented inventions as the clearest abstractions test
application.226 Even so, he rejected a patent law abstractions test as
doomed to fail and, thus, forcing judges to rely on public policy.227
Julie E. Cohen and Mark A. Lemley noted an overly abstract view of
software could yield patent infringement where none should exist,
like a copyrighted work’s last abstractions yielding unprotected ideas
with the abstractions test.228
V. A DOWNWARD ABSTRACTIONS TEST FOR UTILITY-PATENT
ELIGIBILITY
In July 2012, the Federal Circuit echoed Judge Hand’s Peter Pan
decision “‘abstract ideas’ test” for unpatentable subjects under
Section 101. As noted, Peter Pan deemed the line between idea and
expression as necessarily vague and ad hoc.229 Likewise, the July
2012 Federal Circuit panel suggested a similar problem in testing for
abstract ideas in patents.230
A. Patent Claims’ Manifest Innate Vertical Abstractions Ladder
Patent law is innately complex because patent claims must try to
capture science and technical concepts with words.231 Thus, patent
law has an innate abstractions problem.
The copyright abstractions test requires abstracting a copyrighted
work. The work lacks an innate abstraction structure, so a fact-finder
must make an abstraction from scratch.
But, patent claim drafting’s whole point is to abstract an
invention’s key patentable concepts. The specification includes the
original claims.232 But the specification must enable the claims.233

226. Id. at n.282.
227. Id. at 123, 132.
228. Cohen & Lemley, supra note 154, at 49 & n.210 (quoting Nichols v. Universal
Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, J.)).
229. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960)
(Hand, J.).
230. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 103 U.S.P.Q.2d 1297, 1303-04 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Linn,
J.) (quoting inter alia Donald S. Chisum, Weeds and Seeds in the Supreme Court’s Business
Methods Patent Decision: New Directions for Regulating Patent Scope, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 11, 14 (2011); Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1316
(2011)).
231. See, e.g., FABER, supra note 102.
232. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2006).
233. Id. § 112(a).
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This symbiotic structure means each claim has some innate selfenablement and can help enable other claims.
Independent claims capture the broadest patentable concepts.234
Thus, they abstract the specification’s inventive concepts. In turn,
dependent claims depend on the broadest claims and vary in scope to
reach narrower concepts.235 Even so, the dependent claims abstract
concepts in the patent.
Thus, unlike a copyrighted work, a patent’s claim structure
manifests an innate abstraction ladder. So, there is no need to split a
patent into two inventions matched with the specification and claims
to get an abstraction ladder as Chiang did.236
Further abstracting or “boiling down” the claims will only lead
to more abstract ideas than they really contain and improperly,
misleadingly, ascribe these more abstract ideas to the claims. As the
Second Circuit noted: “Unlike the subject matter of a patent,
copyrighted material need be not new, but only original.”237 Thus, the
Hand abstractions test for patent-eligibility would test for new ideas in
claims. But, “new ideas” include tests for Sections 102 and 103,
along with Section 101.
B. Young’s Horizontal Abstractions—Over-Abstraction
Confusion
Young has proposed building an abstraction for each claim at
each level.238 I term this a “horizontal abstraction” for each claim in
the innate vertical abstraction claim structure.
Young gives a few examples. For instance, he gives an “object”
(i.e., article of manufacture) abstraction ladder for a soccer ball: A) a
sphere—mathematical equation for all balls; B) a ball having a
spherical wall—covering any physical ball; C) a multi-panel soccer
ball—covering all soccer balls; and D) a soccer ball having a valve
for receiving an inflation needle.239 In essence, this series abstracts
the soccer ball claim (D).
But, this approach confuses the issue. The soccer ball claim (D)
fails to claim the sphere (A), the ball having a spherical wall (B), and
the multi-panel soccer ball (C). Even so, Section 101 subject matter
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

FABER, supra note 102, § 2:10.
Id.
Chiang, Levels of Abstraction, supra note 6, at 1101, 1118-22.
Ricker v. Gen. Elec. Co., 162 F.2d 141, 142 (2d Cir. 1947) (Clark, J.).
Young, supra note 11.
Id.
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eligibility should not bar any of the “abstractions” except the
mathematical equation, or abstract idea, of a sphere.
This horizontal abstraction approach to sifting abstract ideas
from claim ideas is really an artifact of trying to sift ideas from
expression in a copyrighted work. Though copyright fails to protect
ideas, patents manifestly protect ideas.240
More to the point would be a method to tell whether the abstract
idea, mathematical formula, or natural law is actually all the claim
contains.
C. Abstractions Test in Context—Patent Merger Tests for
Ineligible Subject Matter
As noted, copyright’s abstractions test sits within a general ideaexpression structure. Merger bars copyright by combining ideas with
their limited expression; an idea than can only be expressed in a few
ways bars copyrighting the idea’s expression.241 Thus, by flipping the
abstractions test to move down the abstractions ladder, merger looks
for the ways an idea can be expressed. If an idea can only be
expressed in a few ways, the work only expresses that idea and lacks
copyright eligibility.
For patent law, merger should bar patenting the abstract idea.
Rather than moving up abstractions ladder to test patent-eligibility,
merger moves down the abstractions ladder from the abstract idea.
Unlike copyright’s ineligible ideas, patent’s ineligible abstract ideas
may be expressed in many ways. Returning to Young’s simple
example, the abstract idea is the sphere. In words, a “sphere” shape
can be expressed as: ball; globe; round solid figure; bubble; or orb.
All these terms express the abstract “sphere” shape idea and would be
patent ineligible if the sole term in a claim. Words have innate
problems expressing science laws.242
Though Young did not write it, the express mathematical
formula for a sphere is x2 + y2 + z2 = R2. In essence, Young assumed
(correctly) that the abstract “sphere” idea and its mathematical
formula expressed the same abstract idea. But, as may be obvious,
not all abstract ideas reduce to formulas, and not all mathematical
formulas have such simple word descriptions.
240. See, e.g., Confold Pac., Inc. v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 433 F.3d 952, 958-59 (7th Cir.
2006) (Posner, J.).
241. See generally GINSBURG & GORMAN, supra note 162, at 30-31; LEAFFER, supra note
162, § 2.13[B][1].
242. See generally GINSBURG & GORMAN, supra note 162, at 4-6.
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D. Visual Claim Concepts & Mannion’s Copyright Critique
Following Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., patent claims might
fall into “literary” and “visual” types.243 As “literary works,” patent
claims could be compared against word forms of natural laws or
abstract ideas.
The science and technical concepts in claims often involve visual
descriptions.
For instance, patent claims describe: structure,
mounting methods, fasteners, bearings, springs, numbers, relative
placement, voids, shapes, material and optical properties, fluid flow,
position, materials, electrical properties, transforming rotation to
translation, transferring translation to translation, sequences,
movement, and transforming rotation to rotation.244 In fact, many
claim terms fit into these types.245
Thus, the Mannion literary-visual split can likely be ignored in
patent law. Despite expressing non-verbal concepts, patent claim
structure naturally abstracts concepts.
E. Abstractions Test Like Standard Patent Infringement
Analysis
Patent claims are text. In essence, patent infringement analysis
tests whether a claim’s wording reads on the accused product and
process. This amounts to comparing a patent’s abstract description,
the claims, against the accused product or process.246 In essence, this
process compares an abstraction of the invention against an
abstraction of the accused product or process.
F. Down the Abstractions Ladder to Counteract Compulsions
& Test’s Bias
As noted, humans have an innate bias to abstraction.247 First,
humans compulsively metaphorize almost everything, even extremely
sophisticated science concepts. Second, humans further compulsively
abstract the real world by lumping objects and concepts into blobs.
This familiar “my eyes glaze over” thinking is well-known to
scientists and engineers who talk to people lacking a technical
background. And, as noted, scientists, engineers, lawyers, and judges
243. Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 455-61 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
244. FABER, supra note 102, app. B, at 5-8.
245. Id. (listing claim terms under these types).
246. Zenith Labs, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 19 F.3d 1418, 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(citing Martin v. Barber, 755 F.2d 1564, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
247. See discussion supra Part III.D-E.
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are not immune from this bias. In essence, these abstraction biases
abstract up the abstraction ladder.
To counteract these innate human compulsions, moving
downward in abstractions from an alleged science concept or science
law in the claims puts human reason to work against instinctual
biases.
Also, as noted, the abstractions test has a well-known overabstraction problem in copyright.248 As patent claims have a manifest
abstraction ladder, one need not further abstract the claims. The
whole point of patent claims is to abstract patentable ideas from an
invention. Given the over-abstraction bias from abstracting up from
allegedly copyrightable, or copyright-infringing, works in copyright,
further abstracting patent claims is unwise and risks retracing
copyright’s hard lessons with the abstractions test in patent law.
G. Automatic Adaptation to New Science Expressions
As noted, the whole point of science is to find new science law
expressions. In fact, human science expressions, in logic, math, and
language, continually change with periodic revolutionary shifts. The
abstractions test for patent-eligibility has no ties to any particular
human science concept or science law expression. Thus, the
abstractions test for patent-eligibility can evolve as science evolves.
VI. PATENT-INELIGIBLE ABSTRACT IDEAS, NATURAL LAWS, &
NATURAL PHENOMENA
To complete the downward abstractions test for patenteligibility, we must know where to start. What is the abstract idea,
natural law, or natural phenomenon at the top?
Generally, “abstract ideas” (i.e., science concepts) and “laws of
nature” (i.e., science laws), relevant to the top abstraction level will
vary by invention class. For instance, method claims will normally be
compared against science laws, that is, universal or statistical
statements, because methods include steps or acts, such as gerunds.
A. Abstract Science Ideas are Science Concepts: Classificatory,
Comparative, & Quantitative
Rudolf Carnap placed science concepts into three groups:
classificatory, comparative, and quantitative.249
Classificatory

248.
249.

Cohen & Lemley, supra note 154, at 49 & n.210.
CARNAP, supra note 69, at 51-54.
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concepts place objects in classes with more information required for
placing objects in narrow classes.250 For instance, biologists apply
classificatory concepts to place plants and animals in species,
families, and genera.251 Describing something as a living organism
places it in a class.252 Further describing it as an animal, a narrower
class, requires more information.253 Labeling it a mammal needs still
more information.254
Comparative concepts tell how an object relates to another
object.255 For instance, a psychologist may rate a job applicant as
more or less imaginative than another applicant.256 Also, a balancing
scale can determine the heavier of two objects.257 Comparative
concepts are intermediate between classificatory and quantitative
concepts.258 For instance, labeling an object as warm or cool places it
in either the warm class or the cool class.259 But, the comparative
concepts warmer and cooler tell how the object relates to another
object.260
Quantitative concepts involve numbers and measurement.261
Each quantitative concept corresponds to a comparative concept
pair.262 For instance, temperature can be measured in degrees. In
turn, temperature corresponds to the comparative concepts of warmer
and cooler, or hotter and colder.263 Many measurement schemes
require multiple magnitudes. For instance, unlike temperature,
measuring physical size requires values for length, width, and height.
B. Natural Laws: Science Laws Built on Science Concepts
Science continually struggles with innate problems dividing the
abstract from the concrete.264 Sciences laws sum up observed

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Id. at 51, 53.
Id. at 51.
Id.
Id.
Id.
CARNAP, supra, note 69, at 51-58.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 53-58.
Id. at 51-52.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 53.
CARNAP, supra, note 69, at 58-114.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 51, 103.
Id. at 102-03.

CARTER

508

7/14/2014 6:56 PM

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 30

regularities from multiple events.265 They “are nothing more than
statements expressing these regularities as precisely as possible.”266
Science laws fall into two types: universal and statistical.267
Universal laws state absolute relations while statistical laws state a
quantitative relationship between items.268 For instance, following
Carnap, the statement, “All ice is cold,” is a universal law while the
statement, “About half the children born each year are boys,” is a
statistical law.269 Equations are special cases of universal and
statistical science laws.
Though not as important here, Carnap further classified laws as
empirical and theoretical.270 Empirical laws deal with directly
observable or easily measurable properties; they tend to involve
macroscopic events.271
Empirical laws may be qualitative or quantitative.272 For
instance, “all ravens are black” is a qualitative empirical law
describing ravens as having the quality “black.”273 Likewise, a
quantitative empirical law generalizes relationships between
quantities obtained from simple measurements.274 For instance, the
universal gas laws and Ohm’s law relating voltage to current and
resistance are empirical quantitative laws.275
Unlike empirical laws, theoretical laws deal with concepts not so
readily observable, such as microscopic events and elementary
particles.276 The laws are “theoretical” only in that they relate to
different types of concepts and observables, not that the laws lack
confirmation.277
Science laws often relate causes and effects. Machines often
involve cooperating parts.278 As method claims state steps or acts,
often gerunds, method claims are more easily compared with science

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Id. at 3
Id.
CARNAP, supra note 69, at 3.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 226-29, 240-46.
Id. at 6, 225-28.
Id. at 58-59, 226-27.
CARNAP, supra note 69, at 5-6, 227.
Id. at 226-27.
Id. at 227.
Id. at 6, 227-29.
Id. at 227-29, 240-46.
See FABER, supra note 102, § 5:1.
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laws than machines.
Given the machine-method split, different science concepts and
science laws may sit atop the abstraction ladder for machines versus
methods.
C. Patent-Ineligible Abstract Ideas & Natural Laws
An invention is a patent-ineligible abstract idea or natural law
when it is a science concept, science law, or equation expressed in
words as implied by adding trivial features to the alleged science
concept, science law, or equation to reach the patent claim.
D. Manufactured Articles & Matter Compositions—Natural
Objects & Phenomena, Math Relations
Articles of manufacture are objects.279 But, perhaps showing an
abstraction bias, practitioners rarely separate “manufactures” from
“machines.”280
Science concepts and science laws do not sit atop the ladder for
articles of manufacture. Science concepts classify, compare, or
quantify phenomena.281 How concepts classifying, comparing, or
quantifying phenomena can be articles of manufacture is unclear.
Further, science laws make general absolute or statistical statements
about phenomena.282 Again, it is tough to conceive of how a science
law relates to an article.
But, a natural object, or natural phenomenon, or math
relationship may sit atop an article abstraction ladder. Articles of
manufacture are objects without moving parts.283 Rocks, slabs, and
maybe dirt, are natural objects. Likewise, an object might be
describable by a math formula. For instance, circles and spheres are
describable by an equation.284 Further, naturally occurring bacteria
and viruses can sit atop an abstraction ladder to try to reach
genetically engineered organisms.
E. Computers
Though not expressly included in my downward abstraction
scheme, “computers” share some general features. They are not
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

FABER, supra note 102, § 5:1.
Compare id., with 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
CARNAP, supra note 69, at 51-54.
Id. at 3.
FABER, supra note 102, § 5.1.
E.g., Young, supra note 11.
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science concepts, nor are they science laws made of science concepts.
They are also not natural phenomena, like rain, or natural objects, like
rocks or the sun. They are concrete things with interrelated parts.
Justice Stevens suggests that tying business methods to machines
makes the methods patent-eligible.285 And, as in Diehr,286 a computer
achieving results unattainable by persons might make an invention
eligible.
Regardless, the true test of patent-eligibility is whether a
particular claim with a computer can be reached by a trivial
downward abstraction from an alleged science concept, science law,
or natural phenomenon/object. These distinctions will become clearer
below in analyzing the claims in CLS Bank v. Alice Corp.
VII. THE DOWNWARD PATENT-ELIGIBILITY ABSTRACTIONS TEST
APPLIED TO CLS BANK V. ALICE CORP.
I will now show how to apply the downward patent-eligibility
abstractions test with a real-world problem—the claims in CLS Bank
v. Alice Corporation. Part of the current controversy comes from
“boiling down” claims before analysis, so I state the claims verbatim
before applying the test.
A. Claims at Issue
Alice’s panel brief quoted five independent claims.287 In my
approach, the independent claims are the most abstract in the innate
vertical abstractions ladders for the patents.
1. Apparatus/System Claims
a. U.S. Patent No. 7,725,375’s Claim 14
14. A data processing system to enable the exchange of an
obligation between parties, the system comprising:
a communications controller,
a data storage unit having stored therein
(a) information about a first account for a first party, independent
from a second account maintained by a first exchange institution,
and

285.
286.
287.
2013).

Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981).
Brief for Appellant at 9-16, CSK Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir.
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(b) information about a third account for a second party,
independent from a fourth account maintained by a second
exchange institution; and
a computer, coupled to said data storage unit and said
communications controller, that is configured to
(a) receive a transaction from said first party via said
communications controller;
(b) electronically adjust said first account and said third account in
order to effect an exchange obligation arising from said transaction
between said first party and said second party after ensuring that
said first party and/or said second party have adequate value in
said first account and/or said third account, respectively; and
(c) generate an instruction to said first exchange institution and/or
said second exchange institution to adjust said second account
and/or said fourth account in accordance with the adjustment of
said first account and/or said third account, wherein said
instruction being an irrevocable, time invariant obligation placed
on said first exchange institution and/or said second exchange
288
institution.

The claim-14 set is shallow; nine of the eleven dependent
claims 15–25 directly depend on claim 14.289
b. U.S. Patent No. 7,149,720’s Claim 68—’375
Patent’s Claim 14 Without the Controller
68. A data processing system to enable the exchange of an
obligation between parties, the system comprising:
a data storage unit having stored therein
(a) information about a first account for a first party, independent
from a second account maintained by a first exchange institution,
(b) information about a third account for a second party,
independent from a fourth account maintained by a-second
exchange institution; and
a computer, coupled to said data storage unit, that is configured to
(a) receive a transaction;
(b) electronically adjust said first account and said third account in
order to effect an exchange obligation arising from said transaction
between said first party and said second party after ensuring that

288. U.S. Patent No. 7,725,375 col. 66 ll. 1-30 (filed Jun. 27, 2005) (issued May 25, 2010)
(emphasis added).
289. Id. at col. 66 ll. 31-62.
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said first party and/or said second party have adequate value in
said first account and/or said third account, respectively; and(c)
generate an instruction to said first exchange institution and/or said
second exchange institution to adjust said second account and/or
said fourth account in accordance with the adjustment of said first
account and/or said third account, wherein said instruction being
an irrevocable, time invariant obligation placed on said first
290
exchange institution and/or said second exchange institution.

Claim 68 seems identical to claim 14 except it lacks a controller,
italicized in claim 14. Like the claim 14 set, the claim-68 set is
shallow; nine of the eleven claims, 69-79, depend directly on claim
68.291 In fact, claims 69-79 look identical to claims 15-25.
2. ‘375 Patent’s Apparatus/Product Claim 39
39. A computer program product comprising
a computer readable storage medium having computer readable
program code embodied in the medium for use by a party to
exchange an obligation between a first party and a second party,
the computer program product comprising:
program code for causing a computer to send a transaction from
said first party relating to an exchange obligation arising from a
currency exchange transaction between said first party and said
second party; and
program code for causing a computer to allow viewing of
information relating to processing, by a supervisory institution, of
said exchange obligation, wherein said processing includes
(1) maintaining information about a first account for the first party,
independent from a second account maintained by a first exchange
institution, and information about a third account for the second
party, independent from a fourth account maintained by a second
exchange institution;
(2) electronically adjusting said first account and said third
account, in order to effect an exchange obligation arising from said
transaction between said first party and said second party, after
ensuring that said first party and/or said second party have
adequate value in said first account and/or said third account,
respectively; and
(3) generating an instruction to said first exchange institution

290.
2006).
291.

U.S. Patent No. 7,149,720 col. 69 ll. 20-42 (filed Dec. 31, 2002) (issued Dec. 12,
Id. at col. 69 l. 43-col. 70 l. 21.
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and/or said second exchange institution to adjust said second
account and/or said fourth account in accordance with the
adjustment of said first account and/or said third account, wherein
said instruction being an irrevocable, time invariant obligation
placed on said first exchange institution and/or said second
292
exchange institution.

Claim 39 only has two dependent claims, claims 40-41.293 Both
depend directly on claim 39.294
3. Method Claims
a. U.S. Patent No. 6,912,510’s Claim 68
68. A method of exchanging an obligation between parties,
wherein an exchange obligation is administered by a supervisory
institution, the method performed by the supervisory institution,
comprising:
maintaining a first account for a first party, independent from a
second account maintained by a first exchange institution;
maintaining a third account for a second party, independent from a
fourth account maintained by a second exchange institution;
electronically adjusting said first account and said third account in
order to effect the exchange obligation between said first party and
said second party after ensuring that said first party and said
second party have adequate value in said first account and said
third account, respectively; and
providing an instruction to said first exchange institution and said
second exchange institution to adjust said second account and said
fourth account in accordance with the adjustment of said first
account and said third account, wherein said instruction being an
irrevocable, time invariant obligation placed on said first exchange
295
institution and said second exchange institution.

The claim 68 set is shallow; six of the seven dependent claims
69-75 directly depend on claim 68.296

292. ‘375 Patent col. 68 ll. 5-35.
293. Id. at col. 68 ll. 36-41.
294. Id.
295. U.S. Patent No. 6,912,510 col. 67 l. 38-col. 68 l. 21 (filed May 9, 2000) (issued Jun.
28, 2005).
296. Id. at col. 68 ll. 22-39.
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b. U.S. Patent No. 5,970,479’s Claim 33
33. A method of exchanging obligations as between parties, each
party holding a credit record and a debit record with an exchange
institution, the credit records and debit records for exchange of
predetermined obligations, the method comprising the steps of:
(a) creating a shadow credit record and a shadow debit record for
each stakeholder party to be held independently by a supervisory
institution from the exchange institutions;
(b) obtaining from each exchange institution a start-of-day balance
for each shadow credit record and shadow debit record;
(c) for every transaction resulting in an exchange obligation, the
supervisory institution adjusting each respective party’s shadow
credit record or shadow debit record, allowing only these
transactions that do not result in the value of the shadow debit
record being less than the value of the shadow credit record at any
time, each said adjustment taking place in chronological order; and
(d) at the end-of-day, the supervisory institution instructing ones of
the exchange institutions to exchange credits or debits to the credit
record and debit record of the respective parties in accordance with
the adjustments of the said permitted transactions, the credits and
debits being irrevocable, time invariant obligations placed on the
297
exchange institutions.

Only claim 34 depends on claim 33.298
B. District Court’s “Abstract Idea”
1. Not a Science Concept
As discussed, science concepts are classificatory, comparative,
or quantitative. They put objects into classes (e.g., hot or cold),
compare them (e.g., hotter or colder), or express a comparison as a
quantity (e.g., temperature in degrees).
The district court rejected the claims as merely expressing the
abstract idea:
[T]he Court agrees that the methods are of employing a neutral
intermediary to ensure that parties to an exchange can honor a
proposed transaction, to consummate the exchange simultaneously
to minimize the risk that one party does not gain the fruits of the
exchange, and then irrevocably to direct the parties, or their value
holders, to adjust their accounts or records to reflect the concluded
297.
298.

U.S. Patent 5,970,479 col. 65 ll. 23-50 (filed May 28, 1993) (issued Oct. 19, 1999).
Id. at col. 65 ll. 51-54.
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This “abstract idea” is hard to understand. Its complexity makes
it almost incoherent and may make it seem more “abstract” than it
really is. Luckily, the district court explained it:
This is a basic business or financial concept much like those struck
down in Bilski II or Ultramercial. At the heart of these claims is
the fundamental idea of employing a neutral intermediary to ensure
that parties to an exchange can honor a proposed transaction, to
consummate the exchange simultaneously to minimize the risk that
one party does not gain the fruits of the exchange, and then
irrevocably to direct the parties, or their value holders, to adjust
their accounts or records to reflect the concluded transaction.
Using an intermediary, which may independently maintain records
or accounts on the parties to ensure each party has sufficient value
or worth to complete a proposed exchange, as a way to guarantee
that a transaction is ultimately honored by all parties, thereby
300
minimizing risk, remains a fundamental, abstract concept.

This explanation has three sentences. The first sentence merely
states that the alleged abstract idea is a basic concept. The second
sentence states the idea again almost verbatim. Finally, the third
sentence, in italics, clarifies the idea.
This idea is not a science concept. First, the idea fails to place
objects into classes (e.g., expensive or cheap), so it is not a
classificatory science concept. Second, the idea fails to compare
objects (e.g., account A worth more than account B), so the idea is not
a comparative science concept. Third, the idea fails to fix objects to a
number range (e.g., tagging accounts with dollar values), so the idea
is not a quantitative science concept.
2. In Science-Law Form
Science laws may be universal or statistical. They describe large
numbers of phenomena. Here, the science law must have something
to do with:
[U]sing an intermediary, which may independently maintain
records or accounts on the parties to ensure each party has
sufficient value or worth to complete a proposed exchange, as a
way to guarantee that a transaction is ultimately honored by all

299. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 768 F. Supp. 2d 221, 243-44 (D.D.C. 2011), rev’d,
685 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2012), and reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 2011-1301,
2012 WL 4784336 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 9, 2012).
300. Id. (emphasis added).
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301

Replacing “to ensure” with “ensures” makes a universal science
law:
[U]sing an intermediary, which may independently maintain
records or accounts on the parties [ensures] each party has
sufficient value or worth to complete a proposed exchange, as a
way to guarantee that a transaction is ultimately honored by all
302
parties, thereby minimizing risk.

Ignoring “as a way . . . minimizing risk,” as a redundant
description, this sentence makes an absolute statement required for a
science law form: “using an intermediary . . . ensures each party has
sufficient value/worth to complete a proposed exchange.” Thus, the
district court’s abstract idea has the form of a science law.
But is this sentence a universal science law? If “ensures”‘ means
“absolutely guarantees,” then the sentence makes an absolute
statement required for a universal science law. As the district court
explained, “ensures”‘ is “a way to guarantee.”303 But, even if
“ensures” means “makes more likely,” then the sentence makes a
probabilistic statement required for a statistical science law. Even so,
it is unclear whether either the district court’s statement really is a
universal science law.
Regardless, I take the district court’s “abstract idea” as a science
law and construct the downward abstraction ladder for the claims at
issue.
C. Method Claims 68 in ‘510 Patent & 33 in ‘479 Patent.
The most important issue is whether one can construct a nontrivial downward ladder from this alleged abstract idea in the claims
to the actual claims. As science laws often describe causes and
effects, method claims are especially amenable to comparison with
science laws. In essence, making a downward abstractions ladder
adds features to the alleged science concept or law to try to reach the
claim.
1. Non-Trivial “Electronically Adjusting” to reach ‘510
Patent’s Patent-Eligible Claim 68
Claim 68’s preamble states “[a] method of exchanging an

301.
302.
303.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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obligation between parties, wherein an exchange obligation is
administered by a supervisory institution, the method performed by
the supervisory institution.”304 Rearranging the preamble, it states, “a
supervisory institution administers an exchange obligation between
parties.”
This preamble differs from the alleged “abstract idea.’ Unlike
the “abstract idea,” this preamble says nothing about ensuring “each
party has sufficient value/worth to complete a proposed exchange.”
But, the phrase, “using an intermediary” seems equivalent to
“supervisory institution administers an exchange . . . between
parties,” if one excludes “obligation.” Of less import, but still
different, the “intermediary” is a “supervisory institution.” Thus,
claim 68’s preamble only has “using an intermediary” but not
“ensures each party has sufficient value/worth to complete a proposed
exchange.”
Does the rest of claim 68 add trivial features to the abstract idea?
Claim 68 requires “electronically adjusting said first account and
said second account in order to effect the exchange obligation
between said first party and said second party after ensuring that said
first party and said second party have adequate value in said first
account and said third account, respectively. . . .”305 The unitalicized
text is equivalent to the phrase, “ensures each party has sufficient
value/worth to complete said proposed exchange” in the alleged
abstract idea. But, the italicized text adds a feature to the alleged
abstract idea; the alleged abstract idea says nothing about
“electronically adjusting” anything.
This addition has import. Claims must be read in the
specification’s light.306 The specification includes the claims.307
Even so, without referring to the other claims or the rest of the
specification, the alleged abstract idea alone “using an intermediary,”
could include a supervisory institution or a person sending postal mail
between parties or a person shaking hands with each party.
“Electronically adjusting” takes claim 68 away from a trivial addition
in a downward abstraction from the alleged idea. Thus, the
downward abstraction ladder from the alleged abstraction idea cannot

304. U.S. Patent No. 6,912,510 col. 67 ll. 38-42 (filed May 9, 2000) (issued Jun. 28, 2005).
305. Id. at col. 68 ll. 7-13 (emphasis added).
306. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting In re Am.
Acad. Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004); 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(d)(1) (2012)); see
also MPEP, supra note 103, at § 2111.
307. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.75(a), (d).
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reach claim 68.
Thus, method claim 68 is patent-eligible in this analysis.
Though claim 68 should be patent-eligible when tested against the
district court’s idea, this analysis says nothing about whether claim
68 is, or is not, novel or non-obvious.
2. ‘479 Patent’s Claim 33 Fails 35 U.S.C. § 112—Moot
Eligibility
Claim 33:
33. A method of exchanging obligations as between parties, each
party holding a credit record and a debit record with an exchange
institution, the credit records and debit records for exchange of
predetermined obligations, the method comprising the steps of:
(a) creating a shadow credit record and a shadow debit record for
each stakeholder party to be held independently by a supervisory
institution from the exchange institutions;
(b) obtaining from each exchange institution a start-of-day balance
for each shadow credit record and shadow debit record;
(c) for every transaction resulting in an exchange obligation, the
supervisory institution adjusting each respective party’s shadow
credit record or shadow debit record, allowing only these
transactions that do not result in the value of the shadow debit
record being less than the value of the shadow credit record at any
time, each said adjustment taking place in chronological order; and
(d) at the end-of-day, the supervisory institution instructing ones of
the exchange institutions to exchange credits or debits to the credit
record and debit record of the respective parties in accordance with
the adjustments of the said permitted transactions, the credits and
debits being irrevocable, time invariant obligations placed on the
308
exchange institutions.

a. Facially Ambiguous Subject Matter—“Exchange
Institutions” & “Ones”
Title 35 Section 112(b) requires the “claims particularly point[]
out and distinctly claim[] the subject matter the applicant regards as
his invention.”
First, claim 33’s “exchange institutions,” is ambiguous. Step (a)
refers to “the exchange institutions,” but the only possible antecedent
is the preamble’s singular “an exchange institution.” This antecedent
308. U.S. Patent 5,970,479 col. 65 ll. 23-50 (filed May 28, 1993) (issued Oct. 19, 1999)
(emphasis added).
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mismatch is especially confusing as “a supervisory institution” seems
to be at least part of, if not the same as, the “exchange institution.”
Also, step (d) requires “the supervisory institution instructing ones of
the exchange institutions.” Again, the “supervisory institution” may
be the “exchange institution[].”
Second, the odd “ones” phrase defies comprehension as it is both
singular and plural, and “instructing ones of the exchange
institutions” may or may not refer to the preamble’s singular “an
exchange institution,” the earlier “exchange institutions,” or both.
How many is “ones”?
b. Prosecution History Leaves “Exchange” &
“Ones” Ambiguous
Interpreting a patent claim demands looking closely at its
prosecution history.309 Rather than skipping this key step, I expressly
examine the history.
1. Only § 103 Obviousness Rejections
Independent claim 33 seems to have been filed as claim 32 in the
original U.S. application on May 28, 1993.310 On July 31, 1996, Peter
K. Trzyna of Baker & McKenzie sent a Preliminary Amendment
adding claims 34-38.311
On January 23, 1997, the USPTO issued the First Office
Action.312 It rejected all the claims, 1-38, under 35 U.S.C. Section
103.313 On July 23, 1997, Rob Sokohl filed an amendment;314 it left

309. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 30-31 (1997)
(unanimous).
310. See Patent Appl. (May 28, 1993), ‘479 Patent, http://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair
(select “Patent Number” bubble; search “5,970,479” as patent number; follow “Image File
Wrapper” tab; download “Claims” document received May 28, 1993).
311. Prelim. Amend. (July 31, 1996),‘479 Patent, http://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair
(select “Patent Number” bubble; search “5,970,479” as patent number; follow “Image File
Wrapper” tab; download “Change of Address,” “Transmittal Letter,” “Applicant Arguments/
Remarks Made in an Amendment,” “Claims,” and “Amendment/Req. Reconsideration-After
Non-Final Reject (sic),” documents received Aug. 2, 1996).
312. Non-Final Rej’n (Jan. 23, 1997), ‘479 Patent, http://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair
(select “Patent Number” bubble; search “5,970,479” as patent number; follow “Image File
Wrapper” tab; download “Notice of Formal Drawings Required,” “List of References cited by
applicant and considered by examiner,” “List of references cited by examiner,” and “Non-Final
Rejection” documents [hereinafter First Office Action].
313. First Office Action, supra note 312, at 2-4.
314. Amend. & Resp. under 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.111 & 1.115 (Jul. 23, 1997), ‘479 Patent,
http://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair (select “Patent Number” bubble; search “5,970,479” as
patent number; follow “Image File Wrapper” tab; download “Extension of Time,” “Transmittal
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claim 32 unchanged.315
On October 29, 1997, Sokohl interviewed Examiner Barton
Bainbridge to discuss “whether the customized contract of the
preamble” in independent data processing system claims 34-38
“should be given patentable weight.”316
On November 13, 1997, the USPTO finally rejected all claims,
1-39, under Section 103.317 On January 12, 1998, Sokohl responded
to the Final Rejection by arguing without amending any claims.318
On January 29, 1998, Sokohl interviewed Bainbridge by phone,
and they agreed the claims were allowable.319
2. One or Two Exchange Institutions & How
Many is “Ones”?
The arguments against the 103 rejections only suggest the
supervisory institution is separate from an exchange institution.
Exchanging obligations manifestly implies at least two parties.
Trzyna and Sokohl never changed claim 33, originally filed as claim
32. Sokohl’s July 23, 1997 Amendment and Response to the First
Office Action discussed claim 32:
The present invention recites in claim 32 a method for exchanging
obligations as between parties. The creation of a shadow credit and
debit record for each stakeholder party to be held independently by
a supervisory institution is recited in claim 32, part (a). These
shadow records initially contain the start-of-day balances of all
parties’ credit and debit records, and are adjusted during the day

Letter,” “Applicant Arguments/Remarks Made in an Amendment,” “Claims,” and
“Amendment/Req. Reconsideration-After Non-Final Reject” documents received July 23, 1997)
[hereinafter Amend. & Resp. to First Office Action].
315. Id.
316. Interview Summ. (Oct. 29, 1997), ‘479 Patent, http://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair
(select “Patent Number” bubble; search “5,970,479” as patent number; follow “Image File
Wrapper” tab; download “Examiner Interview Summary Record (PTOL – 413)” (Nov. 13,
1997)).
317. Final Rej’n at 2–8 (Nov. 13, 1997), ‘479 Patent, http://portal.uspto.gov/pair/
PublicPair (select “Patent Number” bubble; search “5,970,479” as patent number; follow
“Image File Wrapper” tab; download “Final Rejection”).
318. Reply under 37 C.F.R. § 1.116 (Jan. 12, 1998), ‘479 Patent, http://portal.uspto.gov/
pair/PublicPair (select “Patent Number” bubble; search “5,970,479” as patent number; follow
“Image File Wrapper” tab; download “Transmittal Letter,” “Change of Address,”
“Miscellaneous Incoming Letter,” “Applicant Arguments/Remarks Made in an Amendment,”
“Amendment/Req. Reconsideration-After Non-Final Reject”) [hereinafter Reply to Final Rej’n].
319. Interview Summ. (Jan. 23, 1998), ‘479 Patent, http://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair
(select “Patent Number” bubble; search “5,970,479” as patent number; follow “Image File
Wrapper” tab; download “Examiner Interview Summary Record (PTOL – 413)”).
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for every transaction resulting in an exchange obligation. Claim 32
recites that at the end-of-day, these shadow credit and debit records
are exchanged with the credit record and debit record of the
respective parties, in accordance with the adjustments of the
320
permitted transactions, making the credit and debits irrevocable.

I read “exchanged with . . . the respective parties” to mean the
supervisory institution sends its shadow record information to each
party’s exchange institution. This clears the ambiguity between
exchange and supervisory institutions.
Even so, this argument fails to state whether both parties use one
exchange institution, or whether each party has a different exchange
institution. Sokohl’s January 12, 1998 Reply to the Final Rejection
mentioned claim 32 in passing,321 but failed to expressly discuss it.
The Reply never mentions “institution.” The patent, the Correction
Certificate, and the prosecution fail to cure the antecedent basis and
“ones” ambiguities, so claim 33’s subject matter remains unclear.
Thus, claim 33 fails to meet Section 112(b). As claim 33’s
subject matter is unclear, claim 33’s subject matter eligibility under
Section 101 is moot.
D. Apparatus/System Claims 14 in ‘375 Patent & 68 in ‘720
Patent—Patent-Eligible By “Electronically Adjust”
Though in a different patent, claim 14 only differs from claim 68
by adding, in italics above, “a communications controller” where the
“computer . . . receive[s] a transaction from said communications
controller.”322 Thus, claim 14, in essence, “depends” on claim 68, so
claim 68 is likely more abstract than claim 14.
It is only likely more abstract because, against conventional
wisdom, merely adding words to a claim fails to necessarily make a
narrower claim. For instance, “B is determined by A,” is narrower
than, “B is determined, at least in part, by A.”323 And, as claim 14
does not really depend on claim 68, unless through a common
prosecution history, claim differentiation doctrine324 fails to presume
that claim 14 is narrower than claim 68.
The abstractions ladder and comparison are slightly different
from the method claims. Science law statements often describe acts
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

Amend. & Resp. to First Office Action, supra note 314, at 14 (emphasis added).
Reply to Final Rej’n, supra note 318, at 6.
Compare ‘375 Patent col. 66 ll. 1-30, with ‘720 Patent col. 69 ll. 20-42.
Interview with Paul Hickman, in Palo Alto, Cal. (1994).
E.g., Envtl. Designs Ltd. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 713 F.2d 693, 699 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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and effects. These statements fit well with method claims describing
steps or acts, but an apparatus/system is not a cause, effect, or act.
Echoing Justice Breyer’s Prometheus opinion, an apparatus cannot be
eligible if it merely implements a science law.325 Thus, the
abstractions ladder will test whether the apparatus or machine merely
implements a science law.
The district court’s science law (i.e., “abstract idea”) was “using
an intermediary . . . ensures each party has sufficient value/worth to
complete a proposed exchange.”326 Claim 68’s preamble claims “a
data processing system to enable the exchange of an obligation
between parties.”327 This includes “using an intermediary.”
System claim 68’s structure elements are the data storage unit
and a computer. Claim 68 includes a computer “electronically
adjust[ing] said first account and said third account in order to effect
an exchange obligation . . . .”328 “Electronically adjusting” was a nontrivial feature making patent 510’s method claim eligible. Thus,
“electronically adjusting” can also make the system claim eligible if
the rest of the claim is no more abstract than the district court’s
abstract idea.
What part of claim 68 corresponds to the remainder of the
abstract idea, that is, “ensures each party has sufficient value/worth to
complete a proposed exchange?”329 The computer “electronically
adjust[s]” the accounts after “ensuring that said first party and/or said
second party have adequate value in said first account and/or said
second account, respectively.”330 This “ensuring” phrase differs only
trivially from the district court’s “ensures each party has sufficient
value/worth . . . .”331 Thus, as with the method claims, “electronically
adjust,” takes system claim 68 away from a trivial addition in a
downward abstraction from the alleged idea. So, the downward
abstraction ladder from the alleged abstraction idea cannot reach
system claim 68, and system claim 68 should be patent-eligible.
As system claim 14, in effect, adds a controller to claim 68,
claim 14 is also eligible. As with the method claims, this analysis
325. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297 (2012).
326. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 768 F. Supp. 2d 221, 243 (D.D.C. 2011), rev’d, 685
F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2012), and reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 2011-1301, 2012
WL 4784336 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 9, 2012)
327. ‘720 Patent col. 69 ll. 20-21.
328. Id. at col. 69 ll. 29-31.
329. CLS Bank Int’l, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 243.
330. ‘720 Patent col. 69 ll. 29-30.
331. Compare id., with CLS Bank Int’l, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 243.
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says nothing about whether the system claims 68 and 14 are, or are
not, novel or non-obvious under 35 U.S.C. Sections 102-103.
E. ‘375 Patent’s Apparatus/Product Claim 39 Should Fail §
112 ¶ 2/112(b)—Otherwise Patent-Eligible
1. Endless-Loop Ambiguity Meets 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶
2/112(b) under Current Law
The apparatus/product claim 39 claims a “computer program
product.”332 Unlike the system claims, this product has one
element—”a computer readable storage medium.”333 Of course, this
claim seems directed to disk drives, flash drives, CD’s, DVD’s, and
the like.
Unlike the method and system claims, claim 39’s preamble, “a
computer program product,” lacks a clear correspondence to any part
of the district court’s abstract idea (i.e., “using an intermediary”).
But, claim 39’s body includes a storage medium “for use by a party to
exchange an obligation between a first party and a second party.”334
This phrase surely includes “using an intermediary” which is “a
party.”335
a. Facially, Logically, Ambiguous under § 112 ¶
2/112(b)
Claim 39 defines itself in an endless loop. Claim 39 is to “A
computer program product comprising a computer readable storage
medium . . . . the computer program product comprising program
code. . . .”336 “Comprising” has a special meaning; the claim’s
preamble comes before it while the claim’s body specifying the claim
elements comes after it. Claim 39 has two preambles: “A computer
program product” and “A computer program product comprising a
computer readable storage medium for use by a party to exchange an
obligation between a first party and a second party, the computer
program product . . . .”337 In other words, the computer program
product comprises the computer product. Also, the computer
program product comprises the computer readable storage medium

332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

‘375 Patent col. 68 l. 5.
Id. at col. 68 ll. 5-6.
Id. at col. 68 ll. 7-8.
CLS Bank Int’l, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 243.
‘375 Patent col. 68 ll. 5-9.
Id.
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and, separately, comprises program code.
Comprising can be used twice in the same claim if no ambiguity
arises. For instance, claims may state, “A widget comprising a
flange; and a housing; the housing further comprising an object and a
thing.”
But facially, claim 39 is quite ambiguous. In essence it claims
“[a] product comprising a medium, the product comprising a thing.”
Is the product the medium, the thing, or both?
And, nothing requires a storage medium claim to have claim
39’s double comprising form. In re Beauregard dealt with claims
involving computer readable media.338 Those claims have two forms.
Claims 1-9 have the form “A widget . . . said widget comprising a
computer . . . medium . . . having computer program code means in
said medium, said widget having/including: computer code means . . .
.” where a widget is either an “an article of manufacture” or a
“computer program product.”339 Claim 10 differs by listing method
steps.340 The patent claim at issue in CyberSource Corp. v. Retail
Decisions, Inc. also listed method steps.341
b. Double-Comprising Format Matches Beauregard’s
Claim 1
Though In re Beauregard had claims without the double
comprising format, its claim 1 did use claim 39’s double comprising
format. Thus, claim 39 meets Section 112(b) under current case law.
2. Non-Trivial Additions to Reach the Computer Program
Product
Applying the same abstraction ladder to the district’s science law
(i.e., “abstract idea”) likely makes claim 39 eligible.
But, an “abstract idea” for an article of manufacture should be a
natural object, natural phenomenon, or math relationship, rather than
the district court’s science law. An “object” might be described by a
mathematical formula, like an equation for a circle or sphere.342
338. In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1997); U.S. Patent No. 5,710,578 (filed
May 9, 1990) (issued Jan. 20, 1998).
339. ‘578 Patent col. 16 ll. 33-41, col. 16 ll. 53-62, col. 17 ll. 16-25, 57-64, col. 18 ll. 1725, 44-52, col. 19 ll. 36-45, col. 20 ll. 3-12, 37-47 (emphasis added).
340. Id. at col. 21 l. 40-col. 22 l. 4.
341. CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(quoting Ex Parte Reexamination Certificate col. 2 ll. 9-14, U.S. Patent No. 6,029,154 C1
(requested Oct. 26, 2004) (issued Aug. 5, 2008)).
342. Young, supra note 11.
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It is hard to think of an instance where a computer memory,
regardless of what software it contains, would be deemed a natural
object or phenomenon with trivial features. The only natural
“phenomenon” readily coming to mind is a magnetized rock. Thus, it
is hard to think of a computer readable medium that would fail
Section 101 eligibility.
CONCLUSION
This paper has presented a new way to decide subject matter
eligibility for a utility patent. It posits patent law’s abstract ideas are
science concepts, and science laws composed of science concepts, as
defined by science philosophers. Science concepts and science laws
must have particular word forms.
Inspired by copyright law, a Hand abstractions test allows
judging whether a patent claim is an abstract idea, natural law, or
natural phenomenon. Patent claims manifest an innate vertical
abstractions ladder, so there is no need to further abstract ideas from
the claims. To combat human compulsions and the test’s known
over-abstraction bias, the fact-finder must first choose the alleged
science concept, science law, or natural phenomenon. Then, the factfinder must add features to move down the abstractions ladder to see
whether an independent claim merges with the abstract idea. The test
automatically adjusts to ever-changing science concepts and laws and
their word expressions. Like a math relation, the test accepts new
science concepts and science laws at the ladder’s top to test against
patent claims. Thus, the test need not change as science advances.
As it is impossible to test a claim’s subject matter eligibility
without knowing a claim’s subject matter, a claim should first pass 35
U.S.C. Section 112(b) before deciding subject-matter eligibility under
35 U.S.C. Section 101.
This downward patent-eligibility Hand abstractions test gives a
much more coherent, systematic, and practical approach to judging
patent-eligibility than has appeared in recent court opinions and
articles.

